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Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The
Importance of Ulterior Motives and
Fabrications in the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine
By EDWIN J BUTm1oss*
INTRODUCTION
Pretextual searches and seizures are those undertaken by police
officers at least in part for reasons other than the justifications
later offered by the government. 1 Concern over pretextual activity
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamlne Umversity School of Law. B.S. 1977, Miam
nUmversity (Ohio); J.D. 1980, Georgetown Umversity Law Center. The author would like
to thank Claudia Simonson for her research assistance, Jill Orenstein for her editorial
assistance, and Cathy Nading for her secretarial assistance.
I Commentators typically define pretext as a situation where the government offers
a justification for the activity that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered, would
be a legally sufficient justification for the activity. See Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amend-
ment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. lic. J.L. REF. 639, 643 (1985) [hereinafter
Haddad, Another Viewpoint]. They exclude from the pretext definition situations where the
proffered justification is legally insufficient. Although they find such activity illegal, they
do not term it a pretext. See Haddad, Well Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and
Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRw. L. & CiudiNoLoGy 198, 205 (1977) [hereinafter
Haddad, Claims of Sham]; see also Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 70,
71 n.5, 100-01 (1982) (Burkoff labels situations where the officer "acts entirely and delib-
erately for reasons that do not constitute a proper legal justification" as bad faith searches
regardless of the legal sufficiency of the proferred justification). But see Comment, Pretext
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L.
Ray. 1791, 1802-03 (recognizing both situations as pretexts) [hereinafter Comment, Abuses
of Power]. The thesis of this article is that the term pretext is sufficiently broad to include
both situations and that the failure of commentators to consider this explains much of the
difficulty they experience trying to reconcile the language and holdings of various Supreme
Court cases. See infra notes 78-161 and accompanying text.
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has existed for many years, 2 presenting a perplexing problem. The
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the pretext issue and
has given apparently conflicting signals as to whether pretextual
activity is unconstitutional.3 Consequently, lower courts and com-
mentators disagree over the existence and 'the content of a pretext
doctrine in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the approach
courts should utilize to analyze the pretext issue.
The issue of the existence and content of the Supreme Court's
pretext doctrine is essentially a debate between the positions of
Professor John M. Burkoff4 and Professor James B. Haddad. 5
Professor Burkoff insists that a case-by-case pretext doctrine is
alive and well in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that language
in Supreme Court cases demonstrates that the Court will hold
police conduct unconstitutional on a case-by-case basis when the
pretextual motivations of the officers are demonstrated by subjec-
tive or objective evidence s Professor Haddad, on the other hand,
2 Numerous Supreme Court cases have expressed concern over pretextual police
activity. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493 (1958); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). For a discussion of these cases,
see infra notes 107-81 and accompanying text.
I See United States v. Tngg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (Supreme Court's
response to pretext problem ambiguous); Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns
After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L. Rav. 363, 364-65 (1989) [hereinafter Burkoff, Pretext
Doctrine Returns]; Burkoff, Rejoinder: Truth, Justice and the American Way-or Professor
Haddad's "Hard Choices", 18 P. M&cH. J.L. REP. 695, 695 & n.1 (1985) [hereinafter
Burkoff, Rejoinder]; Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 204; Salken, The General
Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion
to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEM. L.Q. 221, 224 (1989) [hereinafter Salken, The
General Warrant]; Comment, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1807 n.88; Comment,
Fourth Amendment Pretexts: Are Two Reasons to Stop the Defendant One Too Many?,
41 BAYLOR L. Rav. 495, 497 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Two Reasons to Stop]; Note,
Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing
,Fourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. Ray. 223, 241 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Pretext
'Problem]. The Supreme Court seemed ready to clarify its view of pretext searches when it
,granted certiorari in State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S.
98 (1987), but instead dismissed the certiorari petition as improvidently granted. See infra
notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
' Professor Burkoff is a Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh. A.B.
1970, J.D. 1973, Umversity of Michigan; LL.M. 1976, Harvard University.
I Professor Haddad is a Professor of Law at Northwestern University. B.A. 1964,
Umversity of Notre Dame; J.D. 1967, LL.M. 1969, Northwestern University.
6 See Burkoff, Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH AND SEIzuRE L. RaP. 25 (1982); Burkoff,
Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 72-84; Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now
You See It, Now You Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523, 544-50 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff,
Pretext Search Doctrine]; Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 365, 394,
409-10. For a discussion of Professor Burkoff's individual motivation approach, see infra
notes 28-58 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 79
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRETEXT Docmnlu
argues that the Court does not utilize a pretext doctrine to find
police conduct unconstitutional on a case-by-case basis, but that
the Supreme Court has adopted the "hard choice" approach to
pretextual activity 7 Under the "hard choice" approach, the Court
is not concerned with the motivation of the officer in a particular
case. Instead, the Court reexamines the authority that arguably
justifies the officer's conduct to determine whether the- authority
should be upheld, restricted, or abolished. This decision is made
by balancing the government's interests against the intrusion on
the privacy and liberty interests of citizens, including the potential
for abuse of the authority through pretextual activity Once the
choice is made to uphold, restrict, or abolish the authority, the
Court will not examne police conduct on a case-by-case basis to
discover and declare pretextual activity illegal.8
The second issue discussed by commentators-how the Supreme
Court should treat pretextual activity-has spawned a greater di-
versity of views. Some commentators argue that pretextual activity
should be struck down on a case-by-case basis upon a showing of
improper motivation by the officer. These commentators offer
different factors to determine the motivation. Professor LaFave9
suggests evaluating the officer's motivation (or at least the con-
structive motivation) based on objective evidence of compliance
with standardized procedures.10 Some lower courts have used a
Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 212-14. For a complete discussion of
Professor Haddad's "hard choice" approach, see mfra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
8 An example of tis is the decision to permit full searches without a warrant
following the arrest of a suspect despite the absence of suspicion of evidence or a weapon
on the person. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Tis presents the
possibility of pretextual activity by police officers. An officer may make a custodial arrest
for a minor violation, not in order to vindicate the state's interest in elimnating such
violations, but to conduct a search in hopes of discovenng evidence of a more serious
offense. Professor Haddad's position is that once the Court has made the "hard choice"
to uphold searches incident to arrest in situations where suspicion of evidence or weapons
is absent, despite the possibility of providing an opportunity for pretextual activity, the
Court will not examine the issue of whether the arrest was motivated by a pretext in the
individual case. Rather, the Court will limit its inquiry to whether the arrest was supported
by sufficient objective facts, e.g., the suspect was engaged in the minor offense.
9 Professor LaFave is a David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor in the
Center for Advanced Study, Umversity of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965,
Umversity of Wisconsin.
,0 LaFave would characterize his approach as making motivation irrelevant:
[Ihe proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated from the
usual practice in this case but simply that he did deviate. It is the fact of the
departure from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the
officer's conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context
1990-91]
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different objective test to strike down pretextual activity, declarng
police activity illegal if a "reasonable officer" would not have
made the stop, arrest, or search in question absent illegitimate
motives." Professor Burkoff prefers a test based on the officer's
subjective intent, although he would accept objective proof of
pretext.12
Other commentators suggest approaches that do not require
examnnation of the officer's motivation in a particular case. Pro-
fessor Amsterdam 3 advocates a "use exclusion" approach under
which any evidence discovered by police may not be used in a
crimnal prosecution unless the rationale used to justify the police
conduct includes thie possibility of discovering the type of evidence
in question. 4 For instance, because the inventory search exception 5
is based on the need to safeguard citizens' property and to protect
officers from false claims, not on the need to discover evidence,
evidence of criminal activity discovered during inventory searches
would be excluded under the use exclusion approach. 6
Additional approaches that do not require examnnation of the
officer's motivation in a particular case focus on the fourth amend-
ment values surrounding the government's proffered justification
to determine the level of permissible police conduct. Alexander
Eiseman, the author of a student note on the subject, favors a
constitutes the Fourth Amendment vi6lation.
W LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AisNnmDNT § 1.4(e), at
94 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the approach seems to be an attempt
to control discretion, which suggests a concern with motivation. Thus, it seems accurate to
read LaFave's approach to be concerned with officer motivation measured objectively, just
as contract doctrine is concerned with the contracting parties' intent as measured objectively.
" See-United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (l1th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the reasonable officer test,
see infra notes 305-21 and accompanying text.
12 Originally Professor Burkoff argued that police conduct should be found illegal
only when the officer's sole motive was "improper." Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra
note 1, at 103-04. He later conceded that an approach requiring only a finding that the
improper motivation was the primary objective was more workable. Burkoff, Rejoinder,
supra note 3, at 698 n.16; Burkoff, Pretext Doctrne Returns, supra note 3, at 397 n.156.
," Professor Amsterdam is a Professor of Law at New York Umversity. A.B. 1957,
LL.B. 1960, University of Pennsylvania.
14 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Ray. 349, 436-
39 (1974).
11 Inventory search of personal effects of arrestee or automobile being taken into
police custody as an administrative procedure does not require a warrant. The functions of
the search are to protect officials from false claims by the arrestee, protect the arrestee's
possessions, and to preserve the security of the police station. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987).
16 Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 647-48.
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balancing test, upholding pretextual activity if the government
interest supporting the proffered justification is sufficiently impor-
tant to support the government's actions not only when the actions
are undertaken with proper motivations, but also when they are
undertaken on a pretextual basis.' 7 Professor Haddad, under his
"hard choice" approach,'" would undertake a similar balancing
test to determine whether, in light of the intrusion on the indivi-
dual's privacy and liberty, including the possibility of abuse through
pretext, the government interests justify the police activity, even
with the proper motivation. If the government's interests are suf-
ficiently strong, then the police activity is upheld regardless of the
officer's motivation in the individual case. If not, the police are
stripped of the authority to undertake the activity, even if their
motives are demonstrably nonpretextual. 9
There are compelling reasons to add to the commentary on the
pretext issue. First, conmentators have failed to offer a satisfactory
analysis of the Supreme Court's conflicting signals concerning the
constitutionality of pretextual activity Second, further analysis of
the suggested approaches and possible alternatives is critical be-
cause an important question for academic discussion is not only
what the Supreme Court has done but what it should do.20 It is
especially important now, because recent activity in the federal
circuits suggests that the Supreme Court will have to directly ad-
dress the issue soon.2'
This Article first analyzes the debate between Professors Bur-
koff and Haddad over the current state of Supreme Court juris-
prudence on the pretext issue. 22 It shows that the Supreme Court's
definition of pretext is broader than the definition of pretext used
by these commentators. The Supreme Court's definition includes
both "legal" and fabricated pretexts. In a "legal" pretext, the
" Note, Pretext Problem, supra note 3, at 263-64. Of course, if the government
justification is insufficient to support pretextual activity, then the motivation of the officer
in the particular case becomes relevant because pretextual activity will be struck down.
11 Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 651-53.
19 Id.
0 Id. at 680; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 698-99.
21 See Oregon v. Olaiz, 100 Or. App. 380, 786 P.2d 734 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (Warren,
J., dissenting) (discussing the various approaches of the federal circuit courts of appeal to
the pretext issue). The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the pretext issue. It
recently had the occasion to do so, but after showing initial interest, declined the oppor-
tunity. See Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, cert. granted, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480
U.S. 698 (1987). For a discussion of Blair, see infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 28-267 and accompanying text.
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government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the
police activity, but that, if the motivation of the officer is not
considered, legally justifies the activity23 In a fabricated pretext,
the government offers a justification that is not the true reason for
the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is
not supported by the facts.?
This Article argues that the Supreme Court utilizes Professor
Burkoff's case-by-case approach to pretextual activity only in cases
of fabricated pretexts. When dealing with "legal" pretexts, the
Court utilizes the "hard choice" approach suggested by Professor
Haddad.21 This Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
apparently conflicting signals can be explained by its failure to
distinguish references to "legal" pretexts from references to fab-
ricated pretexts. Once this failure is revealed, the Court's appar-
ently inconsistent signals can be reconciled using an approach that
combines the alternatives suggested by Professors Burkoff and
Haddad. 26
After reconciling the apparent inconsistency in the Supreme
Court's analysis of the pretext issue, this Article examines the
approaches suggested by various commentators and adopted by the
lower courts. This Article argues that although fabricated pretexts
should be struck down on a case-by-case basis, a pretext doctrine
that strikes down "legal" pretexts on a case-by-case basis based
on the motivation of the officer is misguided. This Article dem-
onstrates that the true evil of the "pretext" case is the virtually
23 Professor Burkoff takes issue with the assertion that a justification can be legally
sufficient without consideration of the officer's motive. He insists that ignoring the moti-
vation simply begs the question of the legality of the officer's activity. See Burkoff,
Rejoinder, supra note 3, at 699. The justification is legally sufficient, however, in the sense
that if another officer was on the scene and possessed identical knowledge of the facts, she
could legally undertake the identical activity undertaken by the other officer, provided she
was motivated by the justification later offered by the government. The label "legal" pretext
for such activity was suggested by Daniel S. Jonas in his student comment examining the
pretext problem. See Note, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1802-03. Use of the term
"legal" is not meant to suggest that the activity, when undertaken with pretextual motives,
is necessarily constitutional. Mr. Jonas himself argued such pretexts should be unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 1803.
1" See Note, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1803. Thus, if another officer was on
the scene with the officer who acted pretextually and possessed identical knowledge of the
facts, that officer could not have undertaken the identical activity as the officer who acted
pretextually even if her motivation was the justification offered by the government because
the facts do not support such a justification.
2 See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 75-161 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 79
FOURTH AMENDMNT PRETEXT DocmTix
unlinuted authority of police officers to arrest and search based
on minor offenses. Thus, an approach that declares "legal" pre-
texts constitutional but reexanunes the underlying authority of
police officers to arrest and search based on a mnnor offense,
offers the better solution to the "pretext problem.''27
I. Tim SuPREMiE CoURT's PRETEXT DocTmNE
A. The Doctrine According to Burkoff
Much of the commentary concerning the pretext doctnne fo-
cuses on its existence and content. Professor Burkoff has been the
most passionate advocate for the proposition that the Supreme
Court views pretextual activity as unconstitutional and will strike
it down when presented with sufficient subjective or objective
evidence of an improper motive. He has advocated this position in
the face of strong evidence to the contrary Two of his many
articles on the topic attempt to breathe life into a doctrine many
people have left for dead.2 Unfortunately, Professor Burkoff's
evidence is not as overwhelming as he apparently believes. 29
United States v Scott 0 was the first case to suggest that pre-
textual searches were permissible. Prior to Scott,. the Supreme
Court's pronouncements consistently suggested that pretextual ac-
tivity was unconstitutional. 3' The Court never declared police ac-
tivity unconstitutional because it was pretextual, but it often noted
in upholding police conduct that the conduct was not undertaken
2 See mfra notes 268-321 and accompanying text.
Perhaps to make his task easier, Professor Burkoff now suggests the worst case
scenario is that the pretext doctrine merely "left" rather than died. Compare Burkoff,
Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 544, 548 ("Pretext Search Doctrine Lives";
"Resuscitating the Pretext Search Doctrine") with Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra
note 3, at 394 ("The Return of Pretext Law").
" See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 410 (stating that the
unconstitutionality, of pretextual activity is "clear beyond peradventure").
436 U.S. 128 (1978).
, See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (automobile inventory
searches upheld, Court notes absence of evidence of pretext); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960) (upholding search but asserting that use of an administrative
warrant for entirely illegitimate purposes would "reveal a serious msconduct"); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958) (rejecting the government's search incident to arrest
rationale because the purpose of entry was to search, not arrest); United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (stating that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence.").
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for pretextual reasons.12 This language suggested that if the conduct
had been pretextual, then the police activity would have been
declared unconstitutional. Thus, when the Court in Scott seemed
to dismiss the claim that officers' activity was unlawful based on
their subjective intent, proponents of a pretext doctrine based on
officers' subjective intent expressed concern. 33
In Scott, government agents acting pursuant to a court order
intercepted phone conversations at a home in Washington, D C.,
where they suspected a narcotics smuggling ring was operated.
Pursuant to the statute authorizing a wiretap, the court order
required that the electronic surveillance be conducted in "such a
way as to minimize the interception of communications [not] oth-
erwise subject to interception "-34 The defendants moved to
suppress the intercepted conversations, alleging that the agents
violated the minimization requirement of the order. They offered
both objective and subjective evidence of the officers' lack of intent
to minimize and their actual failure to minmumze. 35 The Supreme
Court upheld the lower, court's denial of relief.
On the issue of whether the officers' lack of intent to minimize
invalidated the interception, the Court held that the officers' con-
duct must be evaluated "in light of the facts and circumstances
then known to [them], ' 36 and that "the fact that [an] officer does
not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons
which provide the legal justification of the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action."137 The motion to suppress the
evidence was denied because the Court found that the circum-
stances of the case prevented characterizing the seizure of the
conversations as unreasonable. 38
32 See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376; Abel, 362 U.S. at 226, 230. This continues to be
the form of Supreme Court pronouncements on the pretext issue. See Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 372, 376 (1987); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973).
For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 142-74 and accompanying text.
1, See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 81-82 (citing 2 W LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEizuRE § 5.2, at 37 (Supp. 1981)).
4 United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1978) (quoting United States v. Scott,
331 F Supp. 233, 236 (D.D.C. 1971)).
11 The defendants offered objective evidence in the form of a statistic that although
virtually all calls were intercepted, only 40% of those calls related to narcotics activity.
Scott, 436 U.S. at 132. The defendants also offered subjective evidence in the form of
testimony from the agents that no effort at numimzation was made. Id. at 133 & n.7.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 141-43.
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If the Court's statement-that an officer's state of mind does
not invalidate an objectively justified action-is applied broadly to
all fourth amendment activity, then a pretext doctrine based on
the officer's state of mind does not survive Scott. Professor Bur-
koff rushed to rescue the pretext doctrine from such an early
death.39 He attacked Scott on two grounds. First, he argued that
the cases cited by Justice Rehnquist in Scott were inapposite and
misapplied. 4° Second, Burkoff suggested a reading of Scott that
saves the pretext doctrine by simply limiting the type of proof
available to prove pretext. Professor Burkoff suggested that Scott
merely stood for the proposition that subjective (testimonial) evi-
dence of the officer's state of nund is inadmissible to demonstrate
pretext, not that the officer's state of mind is itself irrelevant.4 ' He
read Scott to permit proof of the officer's state of mind through
objective evidence. 42
This reading of Scott is wrong for two reasons. First, Justice
Rehnquist clearly refers to the irrelevance of the officer's subjective
intent, not the inadmissibility of direct as opposed to indirect or
objective evidence of intent. 43 Second, Professor Burkoff ignores
the fact that the defendants offered objective evidence of the
officers' intent by demonstrating that nearly all of their phone
conversations were intercepted, although only forty percent related
to illegal activity.4 The Court used this evidence not to decide the
intent question, 45 but to determine whether there had been suffi-
cient minmization without regard to the officers' subjective moti-
vation.4 The Court found there was sufficient nummization. 4
Professor Burkoff nusunderstands Justice Rehnquist's com-
mand to view the "circumstances" of each case objectively as
39 See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine,
supra note 6.
40 Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 75-81. Even if true, this criticism
merely proves that the doctrine should live, not that it does.
1, See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 525-26, 532.
42 Id.
41 Scott, 436 U.S. at 136-38. See Graham v. Connor, - U.S. , -, 109 S.
Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (reasonableness under fourth amendment depends on "whether the
officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances con-
fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.").
" Scott, 436 U.S. at 132.
4 The court already had found that intent was irrelevant. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
" Scott, 436 U.S. at 139-43.
Id. at 141-43.
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license to assess, using objective evidence, the intent of the officer. 48
Justice Rehnquist's command is to view the facts objectively to
determine whether the officer's knowledge justifies her action with-
out regard to her subjective intent. 49 The question is, for example,
does the officer's knowledge establish reasonable suspicion justi-
fying the stop of a vehicle regardless of the reason the officer
made the stop, even if the officer's action was motivated not by
reasonable suspicion but by a mistaken belief that such routine
stops were lawful?50 This misunderstanding of Rehnquist's com-
mand in Scott dramatically disrupted Professor Biurkoff's theory
when Scott was applied in a later case, United States v Villamonte-
Marquez.sI
In Villamonte-Marquez, customs agents accompanied by a state
law enforcement officer boarded a boat to conduct a documenta-
tion check pursuant to a federal statute authorizing boardings and
documentation checks of vessels with access to the open sea at any
time and without reasonable suspicion.5 2 There was substantial
subjective and objective evidence that the agents were more inter-
ested in the possibility that the vessel was smuggling illegal drugs
than the documentation. 53 The defendants argued that improper
motivation precluded reliance on the statutory authority to board
the vessel.5 4 Justice Rehnquist dismissed this claim in a footnote
stating, "This line of reasomng was rejected in a similar situation
in Scott v United States and we again reject it."155 Professor
Burkoff reacted to this footnote not by conceding that he misread
Scott in his earlier articles, but by criticizing Rehnquist for mis-
reading his, own opimon. Burkoff wrote, "No, no, a thousand
4' See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 525-26; Haddad, Another
Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 674 n.158; Note, Two Reasons to Stop, supra note 3, at 534-
35 n.191.
41 See Graham, 109 S. Ct. at 1872 (citing Scott).
- Although the facts within the officer's knowledge did provide reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, she may not have realized this and may simply have effected a routine
stop that she thought she had the authority to do without reasonable suspicion.
SI 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
52 Id. at 584-85.
53 The subjective evidence included trial testimony by the officers regarding their
subjective intent to board the vessel to search for narcotics. See Burkoff, Pretext Search
Doctrine, supra note 6, at 530-31 n.33. The objective evidence included an anonymous tip
that a vessel in the channel was believed to be carrying narcotics and the fact that the
federal customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state patrol officer at the time
of the boarding. Id. at 531.
' United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 426 U.S. 579, 584 n.3.
1 Id. (citation omitted).
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times no! The Scott decision only involved the issue of the signif-
icance of subjective evidence of pretext, and even then, arguably
in dictum." '56
At the time, Professor Burkoff's belief that Villamonte-Mar-
quez misread Scott apparently was based on his conviction that
such a doctrine was intolerable as a matter of fourth amendment
jurisprudence, and that earlier Supreme Court cases demonstrated
a concern for pretextual activity that would not permit such a
result. Burkoff's analysis of earlier cases was extensively criticized
by Professor Haddad. 57 Recently, Professor Burkoff renewed his
attempts to revive the pretext doctrine by analyzing four new
Supreme Court cases. 58 This latest effort simply repeats the mis-
takes of his previous efforts. To fully appreciate Burkoff's errors,
it is necessary to understand Professor Haddad's view of the Su-
preme Court's pretext doctnne.
B. The Doctrine According to Haddad
Professor Haddad agrees that the Supreme Court views pretex-
tual activity as troublesome, but disagrees that the Court demon-
strates its concern by examining the subjective motivation of the
officer,on a case-by-case basis and striking down activity it finds
to be pretextual. 59 Instead, in Professor Haddad's view, the Court
considers the possibility that a given police activity is susceptible
to use as a pretext "as just one factor in determining whether the
power is consonant with the fourth amendment"' 6 and upholds,
restricts, or abolishes the power accordingly. 61 Haddad refers to
this as the "bard choice" approach. 62 Once the Court makes this
Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 532 (emphasis in original). Of
course, Scott did not directly address even the issue of subjective evidence of pretext because
it was not a pretext case. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 83-84; Haddad,
Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 674, 679. Nevertheless, even if Scott failed to reject
the individual motivation pretext doctrine specifically, it certainly did not preclude such a
result when the same "line of reasomng" was raised in the pretext context. Thus, Justice
Rehnquist's statement in Villamonte does not seem as puzzling as Professor Burkoff and
others suggest. See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrne, supra note 6, at 532; Haddad, Another
Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 679.
See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 653-73.
" See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3 (analyzing Bertine, 479 U.S.
367; Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987);
and New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)).
11 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 670.
Id. at 651-52.
61 Id. at 652.
6 Id.
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choice, then the. subjective intent of the officer in a particular case
is irrelevant. If an officer exercises the power within the parameters
the court has set (that is, only when the objective facts that the
court has held permit use of the power exist), the conduct is
upheld. 63
Professor Haddad argues that this "is the only approach to
the pretext problem that the Supreme Court has used consis-
tently "64 He believes the Court utilized this approach in Chimel
v Califora 65 to limit the scope of the power to search incident
to arrest, in Coolidge v New Hampshire66 to limit the power to
seize evidence in plain view, in Payton v. New Yor 6 7 to limit the
power to enter homes to effectuate an arrest without a warrant,
and in United States v Steagald" to limit the authority to enter
homes of third parties to effectuate an arrest. More importantly,
Professor Haddad explains Villamonte-Marquez, the case that causes
the most difficulty for Professor Burkoff's individual motivation
approach, as an example of the hard choice approach. 69
Professor Haddad notes that the agents in Villamonte-Marquez
were exercising a statutorily granted power to inspect, without any
suspicion, documents of vessels. The question for the Court asked
whether this power was constitutional. The defendants also argued
that even if the power to make suspicionless boardings to check
documents was constitutional, the power did not extend to in-
stances where the inspectors were searching for narcotics. This is
the individual motivation approach to pretext advocated by Pro-
fessor Burkoff. As noted above, the Court squarely rejected that
argument, citing Scott.70 Instead, Villamonte-Marquez utilized the
6Id. at 673.
"Id. at 653.
-, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that the search must be confined to the area within
the suspect's immediate control); Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 669.
" 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that the discovery of evidence must be madvertant);
Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 662.
445 U.S. 573 (1980) (holding that homes may not be entered without a warrant
absent exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement); Haddad,
Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 669.
- 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (holding that a search warrant is required to enter the house
of third parties); Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 662.
9Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 662.
-0 Professor Haddad agrees that Scott did not require rejection of the Villamonte-
Marquez defendant's argument because Scott was not a pretext case. See Haddad, Another
Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 679. He suggests the iromc possibility that Scott was viewed as
the death knell of the individual motivation approach to pretexts only because Professors
Burkoff and LaFave suggested and argued the plausibility of such a reading. Id. As
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hard-choice approach. Recogming the possibility that the exercise
of the power m question could be used pretextually, the Court
nevertheless chose not to restrict the exercise of the power.7' It
could have chosen to abolish the power or to restrict it, as suggested
in Justice Brennan's dissent, by requiring the officers to request
the documentation from the operator prior to boarding and not
permitting boarding if the operator produced the documents in
I good order.7 2 Tis rule would eliminate the opportunity to discover
contraband in "plain view" while on board to check documenta-
tion and eliminate the incentive to make document checks rather
than seek a warrant or the requisite level of suspicion to conduct
a search for the contraband.73 Professor Haddad concludes that
both the majority opinion in Villamonte-Marquez and Justice Bren-
nan's dissent demonstrate the "rejection of the individual motiva-
tion approach in favor of reexamination of the power or doctrine
that, the defense claims, law enforcement officials used pretex-
tually." 74
C. Who's Right?
Both Professor Burkoff's and Professor Haddad's positions on
the Supreme Court's view of pretextual activity have weaknesses.
Professor Burkoff fails to point to any Supreme Court decision
declaring police activity unconstitutional based on the individual
motivation approach.7 5 Moreover, to justify his position that the
Court remains open to pretext arguments based on the individual
motivation of the officer, he must argue that Villamonte-Marquez
was incorrectly decided. Professor Haddad is able to reconcile all
Supreme Court holdings with Ins position, but is unable to satis-
factorily explain the dicta in numerous cases76 on which Professor
mentioned above, however, even if Scott failed to reject the individual motivation approach
to pretext cases specifically, it did not preclude such a result when the "same line of
reasoning" was raised in a pretext case. See supra note 56.
1, See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 679-80.
7 See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 598-610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 The Court also could have required that agents possess reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before stopping a vessel, as is the case with automobiles. See Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignom-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
14 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 680.
" Professor Burkoff views Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958), as such a
case, but other commentators disagree. See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at
655. For a discussion of Jones, see infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolim, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Massachusetts v. Painten,
389 U.S. 560 (1968).
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Burkoff relies for support of the individual motivation approach.
Professor Haddad offers several unsatisfactory explanations for
the dicta77 and is forced to concede that a case-by-case approach
based on the motivation of the officer would be consistent with
the language in the cases as he understands it.78
Professor Haddad's difficulty explaining the Court's language
results from a nusunderstanding of the Court's meaning of the
word pretext. He assumes that the Court is referring to actions by
police officers that, if the motivation of the officers is ignored, are
within the legal boundaries of the fourth amendment doctrine. 9
This is the "legal" pretext defined above. 0 Thus, Haddad explains
that if a police officer arrests a burglary suspect on a disorderly
conduct charge for which no probable cause exists, then no pretext
issue arises. Only if probable cause exists for the disorderly conduct
charge, but not the burglary charge, does the issue of pretext
arise.18
In Haddad's view, in the first case, the court need not reach a
claim of pretext in order to find the officers' actions illegal, 2 but
this is precisely the opposite of the Supreme Court's definition of
pretext-at least of a pretext that requires a finding of unconsti-
7 Professor Haddad makes several observations about the Court's dicta on which
Professor Burkoff relies. First, Professor Haddad notes that several of the statements relate
to the individual motivation of the officer in nonpretext cases. See Haddad, Another
Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 666-68 (discussing Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 and Painten, 389
U.S. 560). According to Haddad, although one can try to extrapolate the Court's concern
about the individual motivation of the officer to pretext cases, the language in the cases
does not support the proposition that the Court has adopted the individual motivation
approach to the pretext issue. In fact, Haddad points out that in many of the cases where
the Court has expressed concern about the possibility of pretext, the result has been an
adoption of the hard choice approach to restrict the underlying power of the officer. Id. at
654-55, 661-65 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampsire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204 (1981); and Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, as examples). Professor Haddad also points out
that the language cited by Professor Burkoff merely expresses concern about the possibility
of pretextual activity but does not state that the Court would utilize the exclusionary rule
to correct the problem or that it would utilize the rule on a case-by-case basis based on the
individual motivation of the officers involved. Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1,
at 659, 663, 667. This is not wholly satisfactory. Even Haddad admits that the language
cited by Burkoff, as he understands it, implies "such relief would be proper in an appro-
priate case." Id. at 659.
71 See id. at 663.
" See id. at 643; Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 205.
10 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
"1 Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 643; Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra
note 1, at 205.
82 Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 643.
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tutionality on a case-by-case basis. When the Court suggests finding
police conduct in a particular case illegal due to a pretext, it is
refernng to a fabricated pretext. For example, consider the situa-
tion where the officer arrests a burglary suspect for disorderly
conduct, but the officer lacks probable cause for either the burglary
or the disorderly conduct charge. Although this activity may seem
clearly illegal without utilizing a "pretext" doctrine, both the dic-
tionary definition of pretext and language in Supreme Court deci-
sions support the conclusion that this is the meaning the Court
attaches to the word pretext in this context. Utilizing this defimtion
reconciles the Supreme Court's actions with its words-something
that other theories of the Supreme Court's view of pretexts fail to
do.
The dictionary definition of pretext is "something that is put
forward to conceal a true purpose or object; an ostensible reason;
excuse.''83 This definition does not specify whether the ostensible
reason is true or false, but it certainly includes fabricated ostensible
reasons and that is arguably the more typical situation.84 Fabricated
pretexts often are used because they are difficult to disprove and
less offensive than the truth. For instance, a guest may be bored
with her host's company, and rather than insulting the host, she
may feign a headache in order to be excused. It is easy to lie about
a headache,85 and the host is not insulted, as she would be if the
guest revealed that she was leaving because she was bored with the
host's company 86 For the same reasons, fabricated pretexts are
attractive to police undertaking illegal fourth amendment activity
A police officer who has a hunch about a narcotics suspect may
S' THE RANDoM HOUSE DICTIONARY (Unabridged), 1534 (2d ed. 1987). See also WEBS-
TER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) 1959 (2d ed. 1951); BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1069 (5th ed. 1979).
U Pretext is listed as a synonym for pretense, a word that includes a fabricated
ostensible reason. See WERSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 1959.
Even if pretense is considered the more accurate term to refer to fabricated ostensible
reasons, the Supreme Court uses the terms interchangeably. In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730 (1983), for instance, the Court in one instance paraphrased the decision in Coolidge,
403 U.S. 443, as requiring inadvertence as part of the plain view exception in order to
prevent the officers from relying on the exception as a pretext. A few pages later, the Court
paraphrased the same language as preventing the officers from relying on the exception as
a pretense. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737, 743.
" It is easy to lie about a headache because it is a common occurrence, so the host
will have no reason to doubt the guest, and proof of pretext is difficult to obtain.
" If the guest actually has a headache and uses it as an excuse for leaving (if the host
were more interesting the guest would stay despite the headache), it would be an example
of a legal pretext.
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fabricate a traffic offense in order to stop the suspect. It is easy
to lie about a traffic violation, 7 and the court is not offended by
a police officer stopping an individual for a traffic violation, as it
would be by an officer stopping a narcotics suspect on a mere
hunch. Thus, from a linguistic standpoint, it is appropriate to
adopt the term pretext to describe putting forth a false, fabricated,
or concocted reason to conceal a true purpose. This is what the
Court appears to have done and explains many of the "cryptic"
statements that trouble Professor Burkoff and other commentators.
Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opimon to the Court's dis-
missal of certiorari in Wainwright v. New Orleans," which Profes-
sor Burkoff cites as supporting the use of a case-by-case pretext
doctnne,8 9 uses the term pretext to describe the government's of-
fering of a fabricated justification. In Wainwright, the defendant,
a law student, was stopped by police because they believed he fit
the description of a murder suspect. 90 The police knew the suspect
had a distinctive tatoo on his left forearm. When the defendant
refused to remove his jacket the police arrested him on the charge
of vagrancy by loitering and then frisked him. Later, at the station,
the defendant continued to resist removal of his jacket, resulting
in additional charges of disturbing the peace by assaulting police
officers and resisting an officer. 91 The defendant was convicted on
these latter charges.
On appeal, the defendant argued that his arrest and the sub-
sequent search were unlawful, entitling him to resist the search.
His appeal was demed, 92 and he sought review in the United States
Supreme Court.93 After granting certiorari and hearing oral argu-
ments, the Court disnussed the writ as .improvidently granted,
apparently because the record was not sufficiently clear to permit
proper evaluation of the issues. 4 Chief Justice Warren dissented,
87 It is easy to lie about a traffic offense because it is a common occurrence so the
court will have little reason to doubt the officer, and proof of pretext is difficult to obtain.
392 U.S. 598 (1968).
" See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 103.
9Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 600 (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
91 These charges were not made until six months after the incident, after the original
charges apparently had been abandoned. Id. at 602.
92 Id.
91 Id. at 603.
9 Id. at 598-600. Justice Douglas believed the vagrancy arrest was illegal and dissented.
Id. at 610, 612-13. Justice Harlan agreed that the vagrancy arrest was illegal, but concurred
in. the dismissal because he felt that the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's
resistance to the arrest remained and could not be decided on the record. Id. at 598. Justices
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although he agreed that the facts were insufficient to determine
the level of suspicion the officers had for the murder, he thought
it irrelevant because the record "establish[ed] that petitioner was
not arrested for murder."95 Chief Justice Warren would have de-
cided that the arrest was illegal based on the vagrancy charge
because it was the only crime for which the police booked the
defendant.9
Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the vagrancy arrest was
"based on the inconsequential circumstance that petitioner had
been standing still for 5 to 10 seconds before the police approached
him." 97 He described the charges as "trumped up," 8 "baseless," 99
and, in language cited by Professor Haddad, 100 "imaginary "101
Professor Haddad asserts that the use of the word 'imaginary'
suggests that Warren believed the police lacked probable cause for
a vagrancy arrest."102 This assertion is too mild. In addition to the
adjectives set out above, Chief Justice Warren expressly stated that
"[t]he officers had neither a warrant nor probable cause to arrest
petitioner for vagrancy by loitering." 03 Chief Justice Warren clearly
viewed the underlying vagrancy charge as unconstitutional because
it was fabricated. More importantly, he described the government's
attempted use of this fabricated offense as a pretext. 1 4 Of course,
if the vagrancy charge was fabricated, then the case was not a
pretext as defined by the commentators. Chief Justice Warren
suggested a case-by-case approach only for fabricated pretext cases,
not the "legal" pretext cases on which the commentators dwell. 105
Fortas and Marshall, who also concurred in the disissal, felt the record insufficient to
decide the issue of the legality of the arrest, but their uncertainty seemed to focus on the
level of suspicion the police had concerning the murder, not the vagrancy. Id. at 598-600.
91 Id. at 605.
96 Id. at 605-07. This suggests Justice Warren was willing to accept a "legal" pretext.
He was deciding 'the case based on the legality of the ostensible reason for the arrest
(vagrancy), not the "true" reason for the arrest (suspicion of murder).
Id. at 604.
" Id. at 604, 610.
" Id. at 604 n.2.
,o' See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note I, at 668.
,0 Wamnwright, 392 U.S. at 607 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
,, Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 668.
203 Wainwright, 392 U.S. at 604 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
10, Id. at 607.
M' In fact, Chief Justice Warren's opimon suggests he would have reached a different
result if the case was a "legal" pretext case. Although Professor Haddad asserts that "[w]e
are left to speculate about what Warren would have said if he had believed that the police
had acted within the fourth amendment," Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW Jou[RNAL
Under Chief Justice Warren's definition of pretext, the only
pretextual police conduct that would be declared unlawful on a
case-by-case basis is activity undertaken by police for reasons that
do not justify the activity and that they attempt to justify with a
concocted or fabricated reason. As mentioned, this is not the
definition of pretext used by commentators.' °0 Under the commen-
tators' definition, the officers offer a justification that is not
fabricated and is valid, or would be valid if the officers' true
motivation is ignored. However, as demonstrated above, a defim-
tion of pretext which posits the ostensible reason as a fabricated
reason is logical under the dictionary definition of pretext and
from a fourth amendment jurisprudence standpoint. Moreover, a
careful reading of the cases relied on by Professor Burkoff suggests
that the Court was referring to fabricated pretexts when expressing
its concern over pretextual activity by police.
The first case Professor Burkoff points to as condemning pre-
textual activity is United States v Lefkowtz. 10 7 At the end of its
opinion, the Court states that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence."' 08 Interestingly, the government's
theory justifying the search in Lefkowitz was not that the search
was authorized as incident to a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant,
but that it was authorized as incident to an arrest for the felonious
conspiracy that the agents allegedly observed. The government
apparently believed that the observation of a crime permitted agents
to seize items being used to commit that crime. The Court rejected
668, the opimon suggests Warren would have upheld the activity.
In support of his.statement that "[u]sing a minor and imaginary charge to hold an
individual, in my judgement deserves unqualified condemnation," 392 U.S. at 607, Warren
cited two cases in a footnote. Id. at 607 n.8 (citing United States v. Cangnan, 342 U.S. 36
(1951), and Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)). In one of those cases, a murder
confession obtained while the individual was being detained on an assault charge was
deemed admissible because the arrest on the underlying assault charge was lawful. Carignan,
342 U.S. at 43-44. In the other case, a murder confession was held inadmissible when
obtained while the suspect was being detained on a "concocted" charge of breach of the
peace. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 631-35. Warren's citation to these cases with the directive to
compare favorably suggests he would uphold police activity justified by the objective facts,
within the letter of the fourth amendment in Haddad's words, but would declare illegal
police activity justified by a fabricated reason and thus not within the letter of the fourth
amendment.
,o6 See supra note 1; supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. One commentator has
noted that the proffered reason may be either valid or fabricated, but treats both situations
identically. See Note, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1802-03.
1' 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 545.
,o Leftkowitz, 285 U.S. at 467.
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that argument because "[tihere is nothing in the record to support
the claim that, at the time of the arrest, . any. . crime was
being committed in the presence of the officers." 109 In other words,
the government tried to use a fabricated offense to justify the
search. It was in this context that the Court condemned pretextual
activity by the police. 10
Professor Burkoff also cites Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Abel v United States"' as evidence that the Court would hold
pretextual activity unconstitutional on a case-by-case basis." 2 In
Abel, the F.B.I., which suspected the defendant of espionage but
had insufficient evidence to arrest him on that charge, informed
imrmgration officials of the defendant's illegal status. Immigration
officials arrested the defendant for deportation. The defendant
challenged his arrest on pretextual grounds because F.B.I. agents
were present at his arrest and searched his hotel room immediately
after he checked out to accompany the immigration officers to
detention. The Court rejected the defendant's argument. Professor
Burkoff, not being dissuaded, points to Frankfurter's statement
that the ruling was premised on the lower court's finding that the
arresting agents did not act in bad faith. Burkoff quotes Frank-
furter's statement that if "bad faith" had been found, it would
"reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing officers [that]
must meet stern resistance by the courts.""' From this Burkoff
concludes that in Frankfurter's view, the court would have decided
the case differently had the arrest been pretextual. But it is Burkoff
who inserts the word pretext into the analysis and assumes Frank-
furter was denouncing legal pretexts. It is more likely that the "bad
faith" to which Frankfurter referred was fabricated pretextual
activity
At the start of his discussion, Frankfurter framed the issue as
whether the government engaged in a subterfuge and whether the
I.N.S. warrant supporting the arrest was a pretense and a sham.14
119 Id. at 462-63.
11o Id. at 462-67. In the sentence immediately preceding the Court's denunciation of
pretextual activity, the Court stated that the case "does not differ materially from the Go-
Bart case and is ruled by it." Id. at 467. In Go-Bart, the police used a fabncated justification
for an arrest to attempt to justify their activity. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931).
.. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
1,2 Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 545.
Id. (quoting Abel, 362 U.S. at 226).
114 Abel, 362 U.S. at 225.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Webster's Dictionary explains that pretense "applies in general to
that which is falsely or deceitfully held out as true."'1 5 According
to Frankfurter, the defendant's claim was that the admstrative
warrant was used for "entirely illegitimate purposes.1"116 In other
words, there was no basis for the warrant because the suspicion of
illegal status was fabricated. The notion of declaring illegal an
arrest on an I.N.S. warrant, based on legitimate evidence of illegal
status, merely because the true motive was to arrest a spy, seemed
ludicrous to Frankfurter:
The facts are that the F.B.I. suspected petitioner both of espio-
nage and illegal residence in the United States as an alien. That
agency surely acted not only with propriety but in discharge of
its duty in bnnging petitioner's illegal status to the attention of
the INS, particularly after it found itself unable to proceed with
petitioner's prosecution for espionage. . It would make no
sense to say that branches of the Department of Justice may not
cooperate in pursuing one course of action or the other, once it
is honestly decided what course is to be preferred.
The Constitution does not require that honest law enforce-
ment should be put to such an irrevocable choice between two
recourses of the Government.117
The key to Frankfurter's pretext doctrine is that the proffered
justification is legal, not fabricated. Provided the proffered justifica-
tion is true, there is no basis for declaring the conduct illegal."18 Thus,
Professor Burkoff's conclusion that the bad faith referred to by
Justice Frankfurter is equivalent to a legal pretext appears incorrect." 9
"' WEBsTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (Unabridged), supra note 83, at 1159.
. Abel, 362 U.S. at 226 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 228-29.
"I To further illustrate this point, Frankfurter offered the case of Coyler v. Skeffing-
ton, 265 F 17 (1920), rev'd, 277 F 129 (1922), as an example of the improper use of an
immigration rationale by the FBI. In Coyler, the Department of Justice requested hundreds
of administrative warrants, many unsupported by evidence, for the arrest of suspected alien
Communists. Id. at 37-45. Thus, in many cases, the purported justification offered by the
Justice Department was fabricated-there was no evidence to support their claims of
immigration violations in the warrant application. Moreover, before the warrants amved,
the FBI proceeded to arrest those named in the warrants. Id. at 40. Because the agents
arrested individuals before the warrants arrived, the justification for the arrests was fabri-
cated even in those cases in which the agents had presented evidence supporting the warrants.
29 Professor Haddad recognizes this but does not offer an explanation for Frankfurt-
er's dictum concerning "bad faith." He merely states that Frankfurter "seemed to employ
a test for 'bad faith' that was very difficult to meet," and argues that Frankfurter's
comments "make one wonder whether he would have found pretextual fourth amendment
activity in any case." Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 659. Further evidence
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Instead, careful analysis suggests Frankfurter was concerned with
fabricated justifications. 120
Professor Burkoff cites Jones v. UnitedStates,2' as a case
where the Court "squarely and explicitly" refused to permit a
pretextual justification by the government. 122 In Jones, the govern-
ment attempted to justify a warrantless search'2 of defendant's
home under the search incident to a lawful arrest exception. 124 As
Professor Burkoff notes, Justice Harlan rejected this argument,
stating, "the record fails to support the theory now advanced by
the Government. The testimony of the federal officers makes clear
beyond dispute that their purpose in entering was to search for
distilling equipment, and not to arrest petitioner."i' '
Professor Burkoff characterizes this language as an example of
the Court's refusal to sanction "search and seizure on the basis of
a proffered 'objective' legal analysis of thp officers' actions."i' 6
The evidence, however, suggests that the proffered justification
was fabricated: The government failed to offer the justification in
any of the lower courts, and the testimony of the officers dem-
onstrated a directly contrary purpose for the intrusion. In fact, the
government did not assert that the agents' purpose in entering was
to arrest. Instead, the government asserted only that it was rational
to infer this purpose from the facts.' 27 This inference was not
that Frankfurter considered fabricated justifications to be pretexts can be found in Frank-
furter's dissent m United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Professor Burkoff cites
this dissent as standing for the proposition that "pretext arrests [were] one of the abuses
[the] Framers sought to curb." Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546
n.106. In describing the type of pretextual arrest that the Framers sought to prevent,
Frankfurter referred to searches "under the guise of a warrant of arrest for a vernal or
spurous off6nse," "searches and seizures made under general warrants in support
of charges real or imaginary," and "[a]rrest[s] for minor or trumped up charges."
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
110 The reason for fabricating this suspicion rather than sunply fabricating suspicion
of espionage may have been that the espionage warrant required judicial approval, while
the I.N.S. warrant was issued by the District Director of the I.N.S. Abel, 362 U.S. at 232.
121 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
"2 Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 545.
2 Although the agents had a warrant, it authorized only daytime entry and the
intrusion was made at night. Jones, 357 U.S. at 494-95.
2, Id. at 499. Although searches incident to a lawful arrest are now limited in scope
to the "lunging area" of the arrestee, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), reh'g
denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969), at the time of Jones, the exception would have authorized a
broader search. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (authorizing the search of an entire office,
including a desk, file cabinets, and a safe as incident to a lawful arrest).
121 Jones, 357 U.S. at 500.
'16 Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 81.
I" Jones. 357 U.S. at 499.
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rational because the officers did not arrest the defendant since he
was not home. 1n Prior to the entry, the agents knew that the
defendant was not home and were asked to delay the search until
he returned. 29 There was no evidence that probable cause existed
to believethat the defendant was home. Without probable cause,
the proffered justification was itself insufficient; it was fabricated.
Professor Burkoff points to several other cases where, in single
sentences, the Court states that pretextual activity was not pres-
ent.'30 Again, Professor Burkoff assumes that the Court is referring
to "legal" pretexts when it more likely is referring to fabricated
pretexts. In Texas v Brown,' Colorado v Bannister,3 2 and United
States v Robinson,' the police activity began with investigation
of a purported traffic violation, an area of police authority noto-
rious for abuse in the form of fabricated offenses. In each case,
the Court noted the absence of any claim of pretext in a single
sentence or footnote. The Court did not explain what it meant by
pretext and could easily have been taking care to distinguish the
case before it from those notorious cases where officers fabricate
traffic offenses to detain individuals for whom no suspicion of
wrongdoing exists. Unless one is willing to suspend credibility, such
a definition makes more sense.
In Texas v Brown, the Court upheld, under the plain view
exception, the seizure of a balloon containing heroin, which was
discovered during a stop at a "routine driver's license check-
pomnt."14 Discussing the exception's "inadvertence" requirement,
the Court stated, "The circumstances of this meeting between [the
officer] and [the defendant] give no suggestion that the roadblock
was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be
uncovered in 'plain view' in the course of a check for driver's
licenses."' 35 It is unlikely that the Court meant that the officer's
motivation for performing the driver's license checkpoint did not
include a desire to nab narcotics violators. The Court conceded
that "the officers no doubt had an expectation that some of the
' Id. at 495.
MId. at 496 n.2.
110 See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 546-50.
- 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
132 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per cuniam).
133 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
13, Biown, 460 U.S. at 733.
135 Id. at 743.
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cars they halted would contain narcotics or paraphernalia
''136
The Court more likely was making the point that there was no
evidence that the officer fabricated the routine license checkpoint
rationale in order to stop the defendant. In other words, the officer
did not pretend to stop cars in a nondiscretionary fashion in order
to apprehend the defendant or others suspected of narcotics viol-
ations. 37 Instead, the officer conducted the checkpoint in nondis-
cretionary fashion, hoping (or intending) that this would result in
the stopping of some narcotics suspects. 3 To hold otherwise would
prevent police from utilizing the plain view exception whenever
they perform routine license checks in areas suspected of a high
level of illegal activity It is efficient to permit the police to attempt
to "kill two birds with one stone" by conducting license check-
points in high crime areas if the police also believe a greater
incidence of license violations are likely to occur in these areas.
Even Justice Brennan has stated that "it would appear a strange
test as to whether a[n] [admimstrative] search which turns up
criminal evidence is unreasonable, that the search is the more
justifiable the less there was antecedent probable cause to suspect
the defendant of crime."'3 9 Permitting such "efficient" behavior
may be obnoxious because it allows the police to selectively enforce
minor offenses against low income groups and particular racial
groups who may live in high crime neighborhoods. However, the
Court has been unwilling to prevent such abuses through a case-
by-case pretext analysis unless the minor charges are fabricated.
The Court's concern about pretextual activity in Colorado v
Bannister'4° is consistent with a definition of pretext as a fabricated
justification. In Bannister, the Court upheld the seizure of contra-
band in plain view during a stop for speeding. The officer initially
1' Id. at 743-44.
M3 The Court noted that "there is no indication that [the officer] had any reason to
believe that any particular object would be in [the defendant's] glove compartment or
elsewhere in his automobile." Id. at 744.
s The Court noted that the checkpoint was conducted in a "medium area of narcotics
traffic." Id. at 743.
M' Abel, 362 U.S. at 253 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Other Justices have expressed the
same sentiment. See Camara v. Mumcipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) ("It is surely
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.") (White,
J., opinion of the Court); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3
(describing such a result as "incongruous") (Rehnquist, J., opimon of the Court).
1- 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
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observed the defendants speeding but was unable to pursue them
before their car disappeared from view He then received a report
of a theft of motor vehicle parts in the area and a description of
the perpetrators. The defendant's car, still speeding, reappeared
and pulled into a service station. While issuing a speeding citation,
the officer observed items reported to have been stolen in the
recent theft. Upholding the seizure of the contraband, the Court
noted in a footnote, "There was no evidence whatsoever that the
officer's presence to issue a traffic citation was a pretext to confirm
any other previous suspicion about the occupants.' 141 The sugges-
tion is that the result might have been different if evidence of a
pretext was presented. But again, the question of what the Court
meant by a pretext is unresolved.
It is hard to imagine that the result in Bannister would have
differed if the Court believed the officer had a hunch (but not
reasonable suspicion) that the car was involved in the reported
theft, thereby creating an investigatory motive for stopping the car
after it reappeared. If that were the case, individuals suspected of
criminal activity would be less subject to traffic laws as they make
their getaway than otherwise law-abiding citizens who happen to
exceed the speed limit. It is more reasonable to believe that the
Court was simply making clear that the officer did not fabricate
the traffic offense.
In United States v' Robinson,'142 the Court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that a traffic arrest was merely a pretext for the
officer to conduct a search for evidence of a narcotics violation.
The court stated: "We think it is sufficient for purposes of our
decision that [defendant] was lawfully arrested for an offense and
that . .. placing him in custody following that arrest was not a
departure from established police department practice.' 43 Al-
though this suggests a case-by-case pretext approach based on
deviation from standardized procedures, the companion case to
Robinson, Gustafson v Florida,'" suggests otherwise. In Gustaf-
son, the defendant maintained that no police department regulation
required a custodial arrest for the traffic offense or established
when a full custodial search should occur. 45 The Court held that
141 Id. at 4 n.4.
1- 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
41 Id. at 221 n.I.
1- 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
143 Id. at 263.
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these differences were not determinative of the constitutional issue.
The important fact was "that the officer had probable cause to
arrest the [defendant] and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest
and placed [defendant] in custody "146 Although the Court likely
would have ruled differently had the officers in Robinson and
Gustafson fabricated the traffic offenses, the motive of the officers
was irrelevant to the Court because probable cause existed for the
offenses justifying the officers' actions.
Finally, in another context, the Court referred to the use of a
fabricated justification when it denounced the use of a pretext by
police. In Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 47 the Court held that con-
sent searches are valid if, considering the totality of the circum-
stances, the consent was voluntary The Court specifically ruled
that the government need not prove the consent was given with
knowledge of the right to refuse. The Court warned, however, that
the consent must be truly voluntary and not coerced, either by
explicit or implicit means. The Court explained that "no matter
how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would
be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion
12148 The Court's meaning of pretext is a false or fabricated
justification. The Court was concerned that the government would
argue voluntary consent as a justification for a search when, in
fact, the consent was coerced.
Once it is understood that the Court is referring to the use of
fabricated justifications when it suggests striking down pretextual
activity on a case-by-case basis, it is easy to see that Professor
Burkoff's criticism of the Court for not following precedent in
cases where the Court upholds police activity that may fit the
definition of a "legal" pretext is unfounded. For instance, Profes-
sor Burkoff has leveled his strongest criticism against United States
v. Villamonte-Marquez.149 He asserts that ample evidence existed
to show that the agent's true purpose in boarding the vessel was
to search for narcotics. He bemoans the fact that the Court ignored
this evidence, particularly the objective evidence. 5 0 But the evidence
Professor Burkoff refers to does not indicate that the government's
proffered justification was fabricated. Rather, the justification was
"Id. at 265.
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
143 Id. at 228.
,49 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
" See Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 528-32.
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a legal one-the vessel was subject to boarding for a document
check. The Court properly ignored the evidence that the officers'
activity was pretextual because even if that were so, the pretext
was a legal one and not subject to being struck down on a case-
by-case basis.' 5 '
This is not to say the Court's concern is limited to fabricated
justifications when it refers to pretext. Rather, the Court's defim-
tion of pretext includes fabricated justifications, and the Court
refers to fabricated pretexts when it suggests striking down pretex-
tual activity on a case-by-case basis. Where the Court has been
concerned with pretextual activity based on "legal" justifications,
the Court has followed the "hard choice" approach identified by
Professor Haddad.
For instance, in Steagald v United States,152 the Court deter-
mined whether a search warrant is required to enter a third party's
home to arrest a suspect for whom the police have an arrest
warrant. The government argued that an arrest warrant should
suffice. The Court decided that a search warrant was required, in
part, because "an arrest warrant may serve as the pretext for
entering a home in which police have a suspicion, but not probable
cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking place.' 5  The Court
is referring to a scenario where police, who have an arrest warrant,
wait for the suspect to enter a home they would like to search but
for which they have insufficient suspicion. Such conduct would be
a legal pretext under the rule advocated by the government. If an
arrest warrant authorized entry into a third party's home, then the
police actions, irrespective of motive, would be lawful. As Profes-
sor Haddad has pointed out, the Court did not announce a case-
by-case approach based on the officer's intent. Instead, the Court
addressed this potential pretext problem by restricting the authority
of police to enter homes of third parties, regardless of intent. 54
- Of course, under the hard choice approach the activity was subject to being restricted
in all cases if the Court felt the opportunity to board vessels for document inspections
without suspicion was subject to unacceptable levels of abuse. However, the Court refused
to take this route despite the urging of Justice Brennan in dissent.
'S" 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
131 Id. at 215.
"4 By requiring a search warrant, the Court also avoided the possibility of abuse
through a fabricated pretext-that is, the police fabricating the possibility of the presence
of a suspect for whom they hold an arrest warrant in order to enter a home without a
search warrant-for which a case-by-case approach would have been appropriate.
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The Court took a similar approach in Chimel v California,155
restricting searches incident to a lawful arrest to the area within
the immediate control of the suspect. Part of the Court's rationale
was that a broader power to search would "give law enforcement
officials the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by
probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest
suspects at home rather than elsewhere.' 56 The Court was con-
cerned with a "legal" pretext-officers delaying the arrest of a
suspect for whom they have an arrest warrant'5 7 to effect the arrest
in the suspect's home and conduct a search. The pretext is "legal"
because, ignoring the intent to search, under the broad authority
urged by the government the actions of the officers in entering the
home with an arrest warrant and searching incident to that arrest
are lawful. Again, the Court restricted the power to search incident
to lawful arrest in all cases, rather than imposing a rule that
required a case-by-case analysis of intent, because it was concerned
with the possibility of abuse based on a legal pretext rather than
a fabricated one. Only if police fabricated a pretext-claimed au-
thority to enter with an arrest warrant when in fact they lacked
probable cause to believe the suspect was at the premises-would
a case-by-case approach be appropriate. In fact, it was in just such
a case, Jones v. United States,"58 that the Court utilized a case-by-
case approach and refused to tolerate a search under the search
incident to arrest rationale..'59
The Supreme Court uses the word pretext to refer to both legal
and fabricated justifications for police activity undertaken for rea-
sons other than those used to justify the conduct. Unfortunately,
the commentators' failure to recognize this has resulted in confu-
sion over the Court's view of pretextual activity. Some commen-
tators have ignored the possibility that the Court uses pretext to
refer to fabricated justifications, believing that such activity is so
obviously illegal it does not require the use of a pretext doctrine
to find it unlawful. 16 Others, particularly Professor Burkoff, ig-
' 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
15 Id. at 767.
17 A warrant would be required under current fourth amendment doctrine. See Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Chimel, the Court assumed the entry to arrest was
valid despite the arrest warrant being invalid. 395 U.S. at 755.
'' 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
0I See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
110 Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 643; Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra
note 1, at 205.
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nore the distinction as they find the Court's denunciations of
fabricated pretexts useful in their campaign to have less obviously
illegal activity (legal pretexts) declared unconstitutional. 161 Ignoring
the distinction between legal and fabricated pretexts, Professor
Burkoff has constructed a seemingly plausible argument that the
Supreme Court would strike down police activity on a case-by-case
basis based on evidence of a legal pretext.' 62 The discussion above
demonstrates why this argument is incorrect.
Although the Court's definition of pretext is not always clear,
it is unlikely that it will strike down legal pretextual police activity
on a case-by-case basis. Rather, when dealing with legal pretexts,
the Court has applied the hard choice approach. The Court strikes
down police activity on a case-by-case basis only when police have
engaged in a fabricated pretext. In his most recent article, Professor
Burkoff persists in his attempt to show that a case-by-case pretext
doctrine based on motivation rather than fabrication is alive and
well in Supreme Court jurisprudence. His effort is unconvincing.
D. Professor Burkoff's Four Cases
In his most recent article on the pretext issue, Professor Bur-
koff criticizes the Court's recent dismissal of certiorari in Missouri
v Blair 63 because the Court deprived itself of an opportunity to
finally resolve "the most troubling questions raised by a few judges
and commentators relating to the existence and content of the
pretext search doctrine ,,164 Professor Burkoff takes comfort,
however, from the Court's decisions in four other cases that he
claims "answered all of the questions raised in Blair-and then
some.' 65 Not surprisingly, Burkoff asserts that the four decisions
"make it clear beyond peradventure that pretext searches are un-
constitutional and, further, that it is appropriate to utilize evidence
of searching officers' motivation in determining constitutional-
ity ,' 66Correct analysis of the cases provides little, if any, support
for the proposition that the Court will strike down legal pretexts
on a case-by-case basis.
"I Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 1, at 75-83; Burkoff, Pretext Search
Doctrine, supra note 6, at 544-48; Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 373.
112 See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3.
6I State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Missouri v.
Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987).
" Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 410.
165 Id.
'66 Id.
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Professor Burkoff's analysis of four recent Supreme Court
cases is flawed in two respects. First, Professor Burkoff continues
to ignore indications that the Court is referring only to fabricated
pretexts when it suggests striking down pretextual activity on a
case-by-case basis. His most recent analysis suffers from the same
problems as his analysis of earlier cases. Second, Professor Burkoff
mistakes a fundamental shift in the Court's fourth amendment
jurisprudence as an application of a pretext doctrine. As explained
below, in three of the cases discussed by Burkoff, the Court dealt
with special exceptions to the requirements of individualized sus-
picion, probable cause, and a warrant, because the government's
purposes -were noncriminal. In these cases the officers' purpose or
motivation was relevant only to determine whether the officers
were entitled to take advantage of the special exceptions, not
because the Court was prepared to strike down the activity as
pretextual. 167 Professor Burkoff misinterpreted the Court's analysis
in these cases as the application of a pretext doctrine applied on a
case-by-case basis to declare legal pretexts unconstitutional. He
compounded his mistake by assuming that tis pretext doctrine,
which does not exist, will apply across the board to the exercise of
fourth amendment power by police officers. Even if the Court's
approach to cases in these areas could be described as applying a
pretext doctrine on a case-by-case basis, there is no suggestion that
the Court would adopt this approach to search and seizure cases
generally Available evidence suggests the contrary
Professor Burkoff cites the recent case of Colorado v. Bertine 65
to demonstrate the vitality of the Supreme Court's case-by-case
pretext doctrine based on a finding of legal pretext. But Bertine is
a reaffirmation of the Court's concern with fabricated, not legal,
pretexts. In Bertine, the defendant was arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol. Before towing Bertine's van to the im-
pound lot, a back-up officer conducted an inventory search that
included looking inside a backpack on the front seat of the van.
The officer discovered drugs and paraphernalia in the backpack
16 Some fabricated, as opposed to legal, pretextual activity may be declared illegal
under the approach the Court has adopted in these cases. The Court eiunates from the
exceptions based on noncriminal purposes only actions by the police taken solely for the
purpose of crimnal investigation. Therefore, if the police engage in a legal pretext by taking
advantage of an actual parking violation to conduct an inventory of a suspected cnminal's
vehicle, their purpose would not be solely criminal investigation, and their actions would
qualify under the inventory exception. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
1- 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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and charged Bertine with narcotics offenses in addition to drunk
driving. 169 The Supreme Court upheld the search under the inven-
tory exception because standard departmental procedures required
officers to open all containers and to list their contents. 70 In the
process, the Court revealed its concern for fabricated pretextual
searches.
In reversing the Colorado Supreme Court, the Umted States
Supreme Court was critical of the Colorado court for relying on
two previous fourth amendment Supreme Court cases invalidating
searches of containers because those cases "concerned searches
solely for the purpose of investigating criminal conduct "17
An inventory search conducted solely for a criminal investigation
purpose-for which the Court was suggesting a different result-
is a fabricated pretext, not a legal pretext.
In both fabricated and legal pretext situations, the police have
a criminal investigation purpose but lack sufficient suspicion of
criminal activity to justify a search. In a fabricated pretext, in
order to accomplish the desired search (or at least conduct a search
that may accomplish their purpose), the officers fabricate a parking
or traffic offense, impound the car, and perform an inventory.
The search is solely for a criminal investigative purpose since the
traffic offense was fabricated. In a legal pretext situation, however,
officers with a criminal investigative purpose decide to take advan-
tage of an actual traffic or parking offense to impound and inven-
tory the suspect's vehicle. Since the suspect has actually committed
an offense, the police have both the noncriminal purpose under-
lying the inventory search exception and a criminal investigative
purpose. 72 Even if the criminal investigation purpose predomnates,
it is not the sole purpose of the police action. Therefore, according
169 Id. at 368-69.
,70 Id. at 371, 375-76.
Id. at 371.
,1 It may be argued that the officers' purposes may not automatically expand to
include the noncriminal purpose. This seems hard to believe, particularly if they know that
by expanding their purposes they can justify their actions. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MN. L. REv 349, 436-37 (1974); Note, Pretext Problem,
supra note 3, at 261-62 & n.192. Nevertheless, what can be said is that the traffic or parking
offense justifies the inventory search by an officer with the desire to uphold the government
interests that justify the parking or traffic regulation. Thus, a hypothetical officer on the
scene with the officers interested in criminal investigation who was aware of all the facts
within the knowledge of the crime investigating officers could legally inventory the vehicle.
That is the crucial point for the Court and what the Court means by viewing the circum-
stances objectively. See United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1989).
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to Bertine, the conduct should be upheld under the inventory
exception. 173 It is incorrect to strike down the search, as the Col-
orado Supreme Court did in Bertine, merely because the police
lacked probable cause for the criminal investigation.
Additional language in Bertine demonstrates the Court's con-
cern with fabricated, not legal, pretexts and has confused Professor
Burkoff in his attempt to use the case to support his analysis of
the Court's pretext doctrine. In deciding whether the scope of the
inventory search in Bertine was permissible, the Court again em-
phasized that "there was no showing that the police . acted in
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." 174 Professor
Burkoff has characterized this language as a "striking reaffirmation
of the so-called case-by-case approach to pretext analysis."' 175 Pro-
fessor Burkoff assumes the language would apply to legal pre-
texts. 76 This is unlikely.
When Justice Frankfurter referred to bad faith m the pretext
context, in Abel v. United States,7 7 he was referring to fabricated
pretexts. 78 Moreover, numerous Justices have opined that it defies
common sense to prevent an officer who has less than the required
suspicion that an individual is guilty of one crime from stopping
that individual when the officer observes the individual committing
M See Judge, 864 F.2d at 1147 n.5 ("It would be disingenuous of us to pretend that
when the agents opened [the defendant's] bag, they weren't hoping to find some more
evidence against him. But, they could have also reasonably had an adnmstrative motive,
which is all that is required under Bertine.").
,74 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. This clarifies the Court's statement in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), quoted by Professor Burkoff, that in the case before it,
there was no suggestion that the inventory procedure "was a pretext concealing an investi-
gatory police motive." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376. By demonstrating a concern with police
activity only when the criminal investigation is the sole justification, the Bertine opinion
makes clear that the Court will not strike down inventory searches on a case-by-case basis
merely because they are legal pretexts for the discovery of evidence of crimunal activity. See
infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text. This is consistent with the fact that the Opperman
Court adopted the hard choice approach to deal with the possibility of abuse through legal
pretexts-officers taking advantage of an illegally parked vehicle to impound it in order to
conduct an inventory search with the hope of finding evidence of criminal activity. The
Court restricted the scope of the search the police are permitted to conduct pursuant to the
inventory exception. Thus, rather than requiring a case-by-case assessment of the motives
of the officer for conducting the inventory in a particular case, by requing that inventory
searches be conducted pursuant to standardized procedures designed to effectuate the
noncriminal purposes underlying the exception, the Court reduced the incentive for officers
hoping to find evidence of criminal activity to utilize the exception.
"I Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 396.
176 Id. at 394-99.
' 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
"I' See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
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a different offense.' 79 It is, therefore, unlikely that the Court would
characterize an inventory search conducted pursuant to a legal
pretext as a "bad faith" search. The Court's concern with fabri-
cated, not legal, pretexts is demonstrated by the Court's specific
reference to officers acting "for the sole purpose of investiga-
tion."'10 That is not descriptive of the legal pretext that Professor
Burkoff wants declared unconstitutional because in a legal pretext
the criminal investigation is not the sole purpose.""' Bertine does
not stand for the proposition that the Court will strike down police
activity undertaken on a legal pretext.
Professor Burkoff insists that Bertine's reiteration of the re-
quirement that police follow standardized procedures is a reaffir-
mation of the appropriateness of an objective pretext analysis on
a case-by-case basis. Professor Burkoff mistakes a fundamental
shift in the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence m a
special class of cases for an across the board objective pretext
analysis. Once one understands this fundamental shift, it is clear
that the requirement of compliance with standard procedures m
the inventory cases is not an application of an objective case-by-
case pretext doctrine.
Historically, individualized suspicion in the form of probable
cause was the prerequisite for finding the government's fourth
amendment activity reasonable and therefore constitutional. Gen-
erally, a warrant based on that individualized suspicion also was
required. In 1967, in Camara v Municipal Court,8 2 the Supreme
Court utilized a different analysis to uphold fourth amendment
activity In Camara, the Supreme Court held that routine housing
'79 See supra note 139.
1o Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. Professor Burkoff describes Justice Rehnquist's disjunctive
reference to a showing that the officer acted either in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
criminal investigation as "curious." Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at
397. But it is curious only because it does not fit Professor Burkoff's analysis. There are
many reasons other than criminal investigation for which an officer may fabricate a pretext
to inventory a vehicle. The officer may have a desire to harass the owner even without any
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The Court simply was making clear that fabricating a
pretext for purposes of criminal investigation, or any other reason, was impermissible. See
Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 211 (noting that courts applying the individual
motivation test often require "bad faith" in addition to criminal investigative purposes).
" *Professor Burkoff simply dismisses the Court's use of the word "sole" by stating
in a footnote that he now favors the "more workable 'primary object' test " Burkoff,
Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 397 n.156. He does not explore the importance
of the fact that the Court has not adopted the test he favors.
1- 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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code inspections must be authorized by a search warrant,18 3 but in
doing so it broadened the definition of probable cause to include
instances where authorities lack individualized suspicion. In the
Court's view, probable cause was "the standard by which a par-
ticular decision to search is tested against the constitutional man-
date of reasonableness." I84 The Court balanced the governmental
interest that allegedly justified the intrusion against the constitu-
tionally protected interests upon which the search encroached to
determine whether the search was reasonable. As the purpose of
the government intrusion was noncriminal, the Court authorized
area inspections supported by a warrant that was issued on a
,finding of probable cause based on reasonable legislative or ad-
ministrative standards instead of individualized suspicion.8 5
A year later, the Court utilized the Camara "balancing test"
in Terry v. OhIo8 6 to determine whether the police actions were
"reasonable" under the fourth amendment. The Court believed
that the probable cause requirement was mapplicable because the
police conduct at issue-brief on-the-scene detentions and pat down
searches-was not witin the scope of the warrant clause of the
foufth amendment. The Court stated, "we deal here with an entire
rubric of police conduct which historically has not been, and
as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant pro-
cedure.' 8 7 The police conduct was tested by the fourth amend-
ment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures because the warrant clause was inapplicable. Citing Ca-
mara, the Court held "there is 'no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.""1) 88
The utilization in Terry of the reasonableness test rather than
the warrant clause spawned one of the most significant changes in
fourth amendment jurisprudence since the amendment was enacted.
In the twenty plus years since that decision, the Court, in a variety
of contexts, has freed itself from the probable cause requirement
10 Id. at 532. Camara involved a routine housing code inspection by the City of San
Francisco. Camara was arrested when he refused the city inspector adrmssion to his leasehold
without a warrant. Camara argued that the statute authorizing such warrantless inspections
was unconstitutional. Id. at 525-27.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 538.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
I Id. at 20.
Id. at 21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536, 537) (brackets in original).
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by utilizing the Camara balancing test to determine the reasona-
bleness of governmental conduct. The Court has determined that
"the standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal
investigations "189 Thus, the Court has freely utilized the
reasonableness standard and the Camara balancing test whenever
it determines that the government conduct was undertaken to ac-
complish administrative purposes, to fulfill the "community care-
taking function,"' 19 or to address "'special needs' beyond normal
law enforcement."' 191 In these cases, the Court has permtted a
trade-off. The Court does not require a warrant, probable cause,
or individualized suspicion if the government undertakes the activ-
ity for limited purposes. One of the first applications of this
analysis, and perhaps the best illustration for purposes of pretext
analysis, is the Court's decision in South Dakota v Opperman. 92
In Opperman, police officers ticketed defendant's automobile
for overtime parking, towed the car to an impound lot, and inven-
toned the contents of. the car, including the unlocked glove com-
partment. The officers discovered marijuana, and defendant was
arrested and convicted on possession charges. 193 The United States
Supreme Court upheld the reasonableness of the inventory search
under the fourth amendment'9 despite the absence of probable
cause because "the standard of probable cause is peculiarly related
to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures.) 1 95
Freed of the probable cause requirement, the Court evaluated the
legality of the search by balancing the intrusion on the individual's
constitutionally protected interests against the noncriminal, care-
taking interest of the state. 196 Finding that the government's non-
criminal interests were substantial, the Court upheld the intrusion,
even though it resulted in the discovery of evidence used in a
crinunal prosecution.
I" Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5.
110 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414-
15 (1989) (drug testing for railroad employees); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74
(1987) (quoting New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
-- 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
193 Id. at 365-66.
194 Id. at 375-76.
191 Id. at 370 n.5.
196 Id. at 367-71. Although the majority opinion did not cite Camara and determined
reasonableness more by looking to precedent than by explicitly undertaking a balancing of
the specific interests at stake in the case, Jistice Powell's concurrence makes clear that a
balancing test was the basis for the grant of authority. Id. at 377-80 (Powell, J., concurmng).
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If the only government interest in Opperman had been the
discovery of evidence of cnrmnal activity, then the -balancing of
interests would have been controlled by precedent, and probable
cause would have been required to uphold the intrusiofi. Therefore,
in order to take advantage of the special exception created by the
Court, the government must demonstrate a noncrimnal justifica-
tion for conducting the search. Discussions of noncrinmnal justifi-
cations for disputed police activity, in cases such as Bertine, are
necessary to deternmne whether to analyze a case as a special
exception not governed by the fourth amendment's probable cause
requrement. The discussions should not be construed, as Professor
Burkoff has, 19 to suggest a subjective case-by-case search for pre-
textual activity.
Likewise, the Court's requirement that the police follow stan-
dardized procedures m inventory cases should not be mistaken for
approval of an objective case-by-case approach to pretextual activ-
ity. Standardized procedures insure that officers do not exceed the
permissible scope of the state's noncriminal interests. 19 This is
crucial because the authority to conduct an inventory search with-
out either probable cause or a warrant is based on noncriminal
interests, and there is no prior judicial authorization of the searches.
Particularly in the inventory search context, officers may be un-
familiar with all the interests involved and the scope of the intru-
sions that they justify '9 A search that ignores standardized
procedures is unconstitutional whether the procedures were delib-
erately ignored in order to search for evidence or the officers were
unaware of the procedures.200 In other words, a non-pretextual
inventory search can be illegal because standardized procedures
were not followed. Justice Marshall's dissent in Bertine clarified
this: "Accordingly, to invalidate a search that is conducted without
established procedures, it is not necessary to establish that the
'" See, e.g., Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 6, at 548-50.
'" See Florida v. Wells, - U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990) (absent a
departmental policy regarding inventory searches, the search in question "was not suffi-
ciently regulated to satisfy the fourth amendment ").
I' See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, 683-85. This is not a problem in
the criminal investigation context, where either a warrant defines the scope of the search or
the scope is defined by the familiar interest of discovering evidence or insuring the safety
of the officer.
- See Wells, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (finding inventory search uncon-
stitutional due to lack of departmental policy without inquiring into the purposes of the
police in effectuating the search).
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police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in fact
a 'pretext.'' '201
Professor Burkoff characterizes Bertine as a case in which the
Court
reaffirmed that a defendant may establish that a purported in-
ventory search was unconstitutional where the searclung officers:
(1) did not possess probable cause, and (2) the defendant can
establish either (a) that the officers failed to follow "standardized
procedures" in their inventory activity, or (b) that there was "bad
faith" on the part of the searching officers or that the search
was undertaken "for the sole purpose of investigation. ' '202
Although he correctly states Bertine's holding, Burkoff incorrectly
equates this holding with a reaffirmation of a case-by-case pretext
search doctrine for legal pretexts. In fact, the standardized proce-
dures. requirement limits all inventory searches, pretextual or not.
Moreover, the case-by-case analysis of bad faith searches and
searches motivated solely by investigatory purposes represents a
concern for fabricated pretexts. Contrary to Professor Burkoff's
contention,2°3 Bertine does not settle the pretext search doctrine
issue once and for all, and certainly not in the manner Professor
Burkoff would like it settled.
Professor Burkoff also points to the Supreme Court's decisions
in O'Connor v. Ortega2 4 and New York v. Burger05 as evidence
of the Court's case-by-case pretext doctrine. Both cases, however,
are examples of the fundamental shift of the Court's fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence where it believes probable cause is an mappro-
pnate standard by which to evaluate government conduct. Neither
case supports the conclusion that the Court will strike down police
activity based on a finding of legal pretext on a case-by-case basis.
2*1 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Professor Burkoff is critical of
the fact that Justice Marshall "implicitly equates the use of the term 'pretext' only with a
subjective analysis." Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 398 n.160 (em-
phasis in original). He contends that Marshall is in conflict with the majority on this point.
But the majority m Bertine did not define the failure to follow standardized procedures as
a pretext. Professor Burkoff labels such a failure a pretext in order to provide support for
Ins case-by-case pretext doctrine. In fact, to the extent the requirement of standardized
procedures reflects a concern for pretextual activity, it represents the adoption of the "hard
choice" approach. The Court has restricted the authority of police to search an impounded
car in every case, whether or not there is any suggestion of pretext.
2m Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 398.
203 Id. at 399.
- 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
- 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
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In O'Connor v Ortega, the Supreme Court authorized work-
related searches of public employees' offices by their employers on
less than probable cause. The Court based its ruling on the con-
clusion that 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make the .. probable cause requirement impracti-
cable' . for legitimate work-related, nomnvestigatory intrusions
as well as investigations of work-related nsconduct."20 Professor
Burkoff insists that Ortega is an endorsement of his case-by-case
pretext search doctrine. To the contrary, the decision demonstrates
the futility of attempting to invalidate a search by showing a legal
pretext.
In Ortega, the parties disagreed whether the search of an em-
ployee's office was conducted as an inventory to secure state prop-
erty or as part of an investigation to discover evidence of
misconduct. Professor Burkoff agrees that the employee's argu-
ment "that the intrusion was an investigatory search whose purpose
was simply to discover evidence that would be of use m adnmms-
trative proceedings" was a claim that the search should be found
illegal as a pretext. 207 Burkoff fails to notice, however, that the
argument failed.
The Court of Appeals in Ortega accepted the employee's "pre-
text" argument and granted summary judgment on the issue of
the legality of the search.23 According to the Supreme Court, the
appellate court's ruling apparently was based on that court's find-
ing of a violation of hospital policy regarding inventories of em-
ployee offices. 20 This is an objective pretext argument; the failure
to follow policy suggested a motive to investigate, not inventory 210
But the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment
for the employee because a violation of the hospital policy "did
not necessarily make the search unlawful. '21  Moreover, the plu-
rality explained that "[a] search to secure state property is valid as
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725 (quoting New Jersey, 469 U.S. at 351).
Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 404.
Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1985).
- Ortega, 480 U.S. at 728. The hospital policy provided for a routine inventory of
state property in a terminated employee's office. The policy was apparently violated because
at the time of the search m question, the employee, Dr. Ortega, was not ternnated; he
was on administrative leave. Id. at 727.
210 The employee also pointed out that no inventory of property was ever done. The
seized property was simply put in boxes. Id. at 728. Professor Burkoff characterizes the
dissent's discussion of this evidence as an application of an objective and subjective pretext
doctrine. See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 405.
211 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 728.
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long as petitioners had a reasonable belief that there was govern-
ment property in [the employee's] office which needed to be se-
cured, and the scope of the intrusion was itself reasonable in light
of this justification. ' ' 212 The plurality did not suggest that if the
employer also conducted the search to discover evidence relevant
to the investigation of misconduct, the search would have been
illegal. In fact, the employer admitted that one purpose of the
search was to look for documents that related to the investigation
of wrongdoing.213 Tins evidence did not sway the plurality
In the plurality's view, the employer's motivation for conduct-
ing the search was irrelevant for two reasons. First, the plurality
held that searches for work-relaied, nomnvestigatory reasons and
searches pursuant to an. investigation of work-related employee
misconduct were permissible on reasonable suspicion.214 Second,
the plurality was concerned only with the justification offered by
the state and whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, sup-
ported that justification. Contrary to Professor Burkoff's conten-
tion, 215 the plurality did not remand to the lower court for a
determination of the subjective motivation of the employer in
making the search. The Court remanded the case to determine the
justification for the search, a necessary finding in order to deter-
mine whether the facts supported the justification and whether the
scope of the search, was reasonable in light of this justification. 216
Professor Burkoff is wrong when he states that "if [the search]
was undertaken for investigatory reasons, it was unconstitu-
tional "217 Even if the hospital undertook the search for
investigatory reasons, it would be legal if the facts supported a
reasonable belief that the evidence of misconduct would be found
in the office and the scope of the search was properly limited.218
212 Id.
213 Id. The dissent characterized the admussion as indicating that the primary purpose
of the search was investigatory. Id. at 736 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 725-26.
2I See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 405.
216 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729.
217 Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 404. If the search was conducted
solely for investigation of criminal activity, the search could have been unconstitutional
because it would not be within the special needs exception and the work-related justification
would be a fabricated pretext. But the employee was challenging the search as an investi-
gatory one related to work-related admimstrative proceedings, not criminal proceedings. No
criminal proceedings were at issue; the case was a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ortega,
480 U.S. at 711.
218 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725-26.
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If the plurality decision m Ortega is "classic pretext" as Professor
Burkoff argues, 2 9 then his case-by-case pretext'doctnne is in trou-
ble. The Court's decision in New York v Burger20 confirms this.
In New York v Burger, the Court upheld the warrantless search
of an automobile junkyard pursuant to a state regulatory scheme. 2'
Again, the Court clearly stated that it was dealing with a case
involving "special need" governed by the reasonableness standard
rather than probable cause. 2m Thus, any discussion of the purposes
of or justification for the search must be read in that context. The
Court nevertheless addressed two pretext arguments raised by the
defendant.
The defendant first argued that the statutory scheme itself was
pretextual, an argument on which he prevailed at the state level.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was uncon-
stitutional because it had "no truly administrative purpose but was
'designed simply to give the police an expedient means of enforcing
penal sanctions for possession of stolen property," ' 'm and author-
ized "searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality
",22 The state court relied, in part, on the fact that police
officers conducted the search-objective evidence of pretext. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the state court's finding of
pretext. The Court did not consider a scheme enacted both for
administrative and criminal investigation purposes a pretext. It
criticized the state court for failing to recognize that an adminis-
trative scheme can have both immediate regulatory goals22 and an
ultimate goal of reducing crime.22 In the Court's view, the fact
that the regulatory scheme shared this ultimate goal with a penal
scheme, and that criminal evidence likely would be discovered in
the course of enforcing the immediate regulatory goals, did not
make the scheme unconstitutional as a pretext. This was true even
if the regulatory goals were subsidiary to the crime reduction
goal. 227
219 Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 404.
482 U.S. 691 (1987).
2' Id. at 693, 718.
222 Id. at 702.
= Id. at 712.
2U Id.
n The regulatory goal was to "ensure that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate business
persons and that stolen vehicles and vehucle parts passing through automobile junkyards
can be identified." Id. at 714.
2 Id. at 712-16.
21 Id. at 713.
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Apparently, the Court will strike down a statutory scheme only
if it is a fabricated pretext-a scheme in which the state fabricates
a regulatory goal not supported by any interest in order to enforce
criminal penalties. The New York statute was not a fabricated
pretext because a proper purpose existed. 2  The dissenters agreed
that a showing of fabricated pretext was required to strike down
the legislative scheme, but they believed that such a showing had
been made. The dissent characterized the scheme as authorizing
"searches intended solely to uncover evidence of criminal acts" 229
that "had no possible admimstrative consequences." 230
The same rationale was decisive as to the second pretext claim,
which asserted that the search itself was a pretext for a crimnal
investigation. The concern with searches "intended solely to un-
cover evidence of criminal acts," 231 indicates that in cases where
the state merely takes advantage of an administrative scheme to
conduct an administrative search with the hope of discovering
evidence of criminal activity, neither the dissent nor the majority
would strike down the search as a pretext. This is abundantly clear
from the majority's citation to Villamonte-Marquez for the prop-
osition that "[tlhe discovery of evidence of crimes in the course of
an otherwise proper admimstrative inspection does not render that
search illegal or the administrative scheme suspect. ' ' 232 The Court's
failure to require the state to explain its motivation for searching
the defendant's junkyard demonstrates that the subjective motiva-
tion of the officers does not make a search unconstitutional.2 3
Once again, the Court was concerned with fabricated pretexts, not
legal pretexts.2 4
22 Id. at 716 n.27.
22 Id. at 724.
2" Id. at 728.
231 Id. at 724.
232 Id. at 716 (citing Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 583-84, and n.3 (1983)).
23 Id. at 694 n.2 ("It was unclear from the record why [defendant's] junkyard
was selected for inspection. The junkyards designated for inspection apparently were selected
from a list compiled by New York City police detectives.") (citations omitted).
Professor Burkoff's assertion that the Court demonstrated its approval of a subjec-
tive, case-by-case pretext doctrine by citing People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 491 N.Y.S.2d
618, 481 N.E.2d 250 (1985), with "evident approval" is incorrect because it is not evident
the Court approved of the result or the rationale in Pace. The Court merely explained that
the Court in Pace was unable to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the statutory
scheme because the Pace court did not view the search as one conducted under the statute.
The Court may have been expressing its approval of the state court not reaching constitu-
tional issues that the state court believed were not raised in the case before it. It is unlikely
the Court was approving a conclusion by the Pace court that the search was illegal because
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Finally, Professor Burkoff analyzes Maryland v Garrison235 as
a case in which the Court answers affirmatively the question
"whether a law enforcement officer's subjective intent to engage
m unconstitutional activity could render otherwise objectively neu-
tral activity unconstitutional." ' 216 Professor Burkoff finally chooses
a case that deals with police activity justified by the penal interest
of the state. Unfortunately, Garrison has little to do with the
pretext issue. Professor Burkoff again focuses on fabricated pre-
textual activity to support a doctrine that he contends invalidates
legal pretextual activity.
In Garrison, police officers obtained a search warrant for "the
person of Lawrence McWebb and the prenuses known as 2036
Park Avenue third floor apartment."1237 The officers intended to
search Mr. McWebb's apartment and were unaware that there were
two apartments on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue. Before
discovering this, the officers entered Garnson's apartment and
found narcotics there. The Supreme Court upheld the search, 23
because the warrant, when issued, validly authorized the search of
the entire third floor. The Court made clear that although such
authority disappeared when the officers discovered, or should have
discovered, the existence of two apartments of the third floor,239
the officers in this case discovered the narcotics in the defendant's
apartment before they realized there were two apartments. Thus,
the subjective motivations of the officers demonstrated the search was not conducted
pursuant to the adminstrative scheme. In fact, the Pace court reached the conclusion that
the search was not conducted pursuant to the admimstrative scheme in part because it
believed the administrative scheme did not authorize a search if the operator did not produce
the "police book" required to be kept under the statute. This apparently was an erroneous
conclusion in the Supreme Court's view since the search upheld in Burger followed a failure
to produce the police book. Even if the search in Pace can be said to have been declared
illegal as a pretext, the facts of the case demonstrate a fabricated pretext. In Pace, officers
on routine patrol observed what they believed to be stolen auto parts on the back of a
flatbed truck. They stopped the truck, ordered the truck driver to return to the junkyard
for which he worked, followed the truck, and conducted a warrantless search of the
junkyard. The search was not an admmstrative search, not because of the subjective
motivation of the officers, but because of the procedures followed. If the officers instead
had requested the inspection team to conduct a warrantless search of the junkyard and the
team did so according to procedures, the search likely would have been upheld. This would
be true even if the original officers accompanied the inspection team during the search.
That scenario would have been indistinguishable from Villamonte-Marquez.
-1 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
16 Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 399.
23 Gariison, 480 U.S. at 80.
2d. at 80-81, 88-89.
"9 Id. at 85-86.
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their actions were legal because the objective facts demonstrated
that the officers' nustaken reliance on the authority of the warrant
was "objectively understandable and reasonable."m
Professor Burkoff correctly understands the rule of Garrison
to permit the admssion of evidence obtained during a search of
premises that officers mistakenly, but honestly and reasonably,
believe is authorized by a valid warrant. 241 Professor Burkoff goes
astray when he attempts to apply the Garrison decision to pretexts.
He considers a hypothetical case that "poses the Garrison case
facts with everything unchanged except one critical fact: the exe-
cuting officers know full well that they are in the wrong place,
namely Garrison's apartment." 242 Professor Burkoff describes such
conduct as a pretext and argues the Court would strike down the
activity on a case-by-case basis. He is correct that the activity
would be struck down on a case-by-case basis, but that is so only
because the hypothetical case is a fabricated pretext. He mistakenly
criticizes the approach to pretextual activity suggested by the dis-
senters in State v Blair2 43 and by Professor Haddad because he
believes they would be constrained to find the conduct in his
hypothetical legal.2" Once again, he is wrong.
In State v Blair,245 police, officers arrested a murder suspect
and brought her to the station for questioning and to obtain a
palm print for a possible match with a print found at the scene.
When executing this arrest, however, the officers lacked probable
cause to suspect the defendant of the murder.'- Nevertheless, the
officers were aware of an outstanding municipal parking violation
warrant prior to arresting the defendant. 247 When the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the detention
following the arrest, the government argued that the evidence should
be admitted because the defendant was lawfully under arrest for
the parking violation and therefore her palm print was lawfully
acquired. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument.
-o Id. at 88-89.
14, See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 400.
2A2 Id.
'A 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985).
244 Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 401-02.
-, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Missoun v. Blair,
474 U.S. 1049, cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 689 (1987).
691 S.W.2d at 260.
247 Id.
2" Id. at 260-61.
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The Court held that "[a]ssuming an arrest for the parking viola-
tion, the arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a
pretext employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide
"249
Justice Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court dissented. He
argued that "[t]he defendant could be lawfully arrested on the
traffic warrant, and, having been arrested, was subject to search
just as any other arrestee would be."250 Justice Blackmar saw no
reason to suppress the evidence. Contrary to Professor Burkoff's
assertion, however, Justice Blackmar would not be constrained by
his Blair opmion to uphold the police conduct in Burkoff's hypo-
thetical case. Professor Burkoff reads Blackmar's rule to be that
police activity that is based upon unconstitutional motives will be
upheld if a set of facts can be imagined that would justify the
activity 25, This misses a crucial element of Scott's command to
view the facts objectively The command is to make "an objective
assessment in light of the facts and circumstances then known
to [the officer] ,,22 In other words, the command is to consider
the facts within the officer's knowledge, but to ignore the motive
of the officer when acting on those facts. Thus, -the police conduct
in Blair could be upheld only because, m Justice Blackmar's view,
"[u]ncontradicted evidence show[ed] that the police were fully
aware of the traffic warrant at the time of the . arrest. ' ' 2 3
In Professor Burkoff's hypothetical case, however, the very
fact he supplies-the knowledge of two apartments-makes the
search illegal. That fact cannot be ignored, as he suggests,2-4 pre-
cisely because it is a fact known to the officers. The same fact, in
the terminology of this article, makes the pretext a fabricated one.
If the government were to attempt to justify the mstaken search
of Garrison's apartment during the authorized search of McWebb's
apartment, it must lie because, given the facts known to the offi-
cers, no mistake occurred.2"5
249 Id. at 262.
Id. at 264-65 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
2' See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 402-03.
"I Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Maryland
v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985).
2 Blair, 691 S.W.2d at 265.
24 See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 400.
2I Although using different terminology, Justice Blackmar drew the distinction between
legal and fabricated pretexts. He emphasized that, contrary to the case before the court,
the cases cited by the majority involved arrests where the justification offered would not
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Professor Haddad also would likely find the activity in Profes-
sor Burkoff's hypothetical illegal, although he would not refer to
it as a pretext. Because the facts within the officers' knowledge
elimnate the only possible justification for the activity (honest
nustake), Professor Haddad would argue that the court would find
the activity illegal without reaching the pretext issue.216 Only by
distorting the pretext doctrines offered by others and again using
a fabricated pretext to argue his case against legal pretexts is
Professor Burkoff able to make the Supreme Court's opimon in
Garrison support a case-by-case pretext doctrine based on a finding
of legal pretext.
It should be clear by now that the Supreme Court deals with
pretextual activity on a case-by-case basis only when confronted
with a fabricated pretext. Professor Burkoff would like to believe
that the four recent cases he analyzes answer "the fourth amend-
ment pretext search doctrine questions that were before the Court
in Missouri v Blair" by endorsing a case-by-case approach to legal
pretexts.25 7 The cases simply do not accomplish this, a fact made
even more obvious by the Court's ruling in a fifth case, Maryland
v Macon, s where the Court held that police conduct that consti-
tutes a legal pretext is not unconstitutional.
In Macon, a plainclothes detective purchased two magazines
from an adult bookstore using a marked $50 bill. After consulting
with other detectives and determining that the magazines were
obscene, the detective arrested the clerk and retrieved the marked
bill. 9 The defendant moved to suppress the magazines arguing
that, because the officers retrieved the marked $50 bill without
returning the change they had received when they made the "pur-
chase," the transaction was an illegal seizure rather than a bona
authorize the activity even if it were the true reason for the activity or where the evidence
suggested the justification was fabricated. Blair, 691 S.W.2d at 266. Justice Blackmar cites
as one example Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961), where the officer
swore out a warrant based on two minor traffic violations he claimed to have seen the
defendant commit the day before. As Justice Blackmar notes, that is a very different
situation from one where a warrant is already outstanding when the officers become
suspicious of an individual for another crime. Taglavore presented a situation where the
court may well have been suspicious about the officer's sudden recollection of past traffic
violations and did not believe the traffic violations ever occurred. In other words, the court
could easily have viewed the case as a fabricated pretext.
21 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 643; Haddad, Claims of Sham,
supra note 1, at 205.
15 See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 409-10.
- 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
29 Id. at 465.
[VOL. 79
FOuRTH A NDimENrr PRETEXT Docmnw
fide purchase by the undercover detectives. The defendant con-
tended that "[w]hen the officer subjectively intends to retrieve the
money while retaining the magazines, . the purchase is tanta-
mount to a warrantless seizure." The Supreme Court responded:
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny Whether a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an objective as-
sessment of the officer's actions 'in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting hun at the time," Scott v United States,
and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the
challenged action was taken. Objectively viewed, the trans-
action was a sale in the ordinary course of business. 26'
Tlus is a direct holding that the subjective motivations of officers
conducting a search or seizure are irrelevant. Professor Burkoff
agrees: "IT]he Scott language was used by the Macon Court to
render the true reasons why the conduct in question took place
(criminal investigation not ordinary commercial purchase) irrele-
vant. "262 Nevertheless, Professor Burkoff insists that Macon does
not necessarily mean that the Court upholds pretextual activity
because Macon does not involve a pretext.263 His argument is that
pretextual activity requires a subjective motivation that, if consid-
ered controlling, makes the conduct illegal. He points out that in
Macon, the Court did not decide the legality of the officers'
conduct in light of the alleged true motivation-seizure as part of
a criminal investigation.2 If such conduct were legal, then there
was no pretext under Burkoff's definition. Therefore, Burkoff
reasons, "Macon is not a case that deals with pretext issues, ' ' 265
and "does no damage to the concern for the deterrence of pretex-
tual fourth amendment activity -266 A simple hypothetical
demonstrates that Burkoff's conclusions are incorrect.
Assume that a warrantless seizure for criminal investigation
purposes would be illegal if conducted in the fashion it was in
Macon. This is Professor Burkoff's pretext case. If the defendant
raises a claim of pretext, however, it must fail under the holding
in Macon because Macon rendered the true reason for the police
21 Id. at 470.
21 Id. ai 470-71 (citations omitted).
22 Burkoff, Pretext Doctrne Returns, supra note 3, at 371-72.
20 Id. at 370.
2" Id. at 372.
Id. at 370.
2" Id. at 372.
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conduct in question irrelevant. The hypothetical could be what
actually occured in Macon because the Court did not decide the
legality of a warrantless seizure for criminal investigation purposes.
The fact that the Court decided against Macon without considenng
the accuracy of this scenario conclusively demonstrates that the
result in either case is the same. The officer's purchase of the
magazines was constitutional regardless of his intent. This is true
even if the seizure for criminal investigation purposes (absent a
purchase) was illegal and, by Professor Burkoff's definition, the
exchange was a pretext. If the possible illegality of a seizure for
criminal investigation purposes changes the result, then the Court
would have been required to decide the issue in order to rule
against the defendant. Thus, Macon conclusively demonstrates the
futility of raising a legal pretext claim.
By ignoring the pretext issue in Macon, Professor Burkoff
disnusses the most relevant case in the search for the content of
the Supreme Court's pretext doctrine. He must do so in order to
plant the desired answer in the four recent cases he has analyzed.
The answer he achieves, however, is distorted by the flawed analysis
through which it is derived. Professor Burkoff's analysis fails to
appreciate the distinction between legal and fabricated pretexts and
misperceives a fundamental shift in the Supreme Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence, mistaking what the Court views as non-
criminal cases for the application of a case-by-case pretext doctrine
based on a finding of a legal pretext. 267 Under the Supreme Court's
current pretext doctrine, citizens simply do not enjoy the protection
Professor Burkoff would like to provide them. The question re-
maimng for analysis asks whether they should.
II. Cioosic AN APPROACH TO PETmxTuAL ACTvrrY
A. The Individual Motivation Approach to Legal Pretexts
Although some lower courts have adopted the individual mo-
tivation approach to pretextual activity,268 it has been subjected to
26 As a result, Professor Burkoff finds the Court creating a doctnne to provide
additional protection of citizens' fourth amendment rights in cases that represent significant
erosions of citizen rights by excluding a wide range of government activity from the
requirement of probable cause or even individualized suspicion. See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
United-States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting sub-
jective intent approach but adopting objective "reasonable officer test" for legal pretexts);
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increased criticism from both courts269 and commentators.27 0 As
Professor Haddad points out, however, much of this criticism is
simplistic, based largely on the presumed difficulty of deternimng
the subjective intent of officers engaged in fourth amendment
activity 271 Fears that the individual motivation approach will re-
quire "expeditions into the minds of police officers" that will often
prove fruitless272 are unpersuasive given the clear evidence of the
motivation of the officer presented in many cases. 273 Moreover,
objective standards can be utilized to identify pretextual activity
Finally, the utilization of subjective intent in other constitutional
doctrines demonstrates that such analysis is practical and appro-
priate when necessary to protect an important interest. 274 An indi-
vidual motivation approach to the pretext problem may be
inappropriate, however, precisely because the underlying interest
to be protected is not a compelling one.
A search for individual motivation makes sense only if it may
lead to the discovery of an improper motivation. It is still unclear,
however, whether the pretextual motivation that the proponents of
this approach seek to uncover should be deemed improper. 275 The
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710-11 (lth Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.
Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986) (dictum) (whether arrest pretextual turns on the
motivation or primary purpose of the arresting officer).
United States v. Tngg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989) (legality of arrest depends
solely on probable cause and statutory authority to arrest for the mnnor offense); United
States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Causey, 834
F.2d 1179, 1182-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (legality of stop depends solely on existence of probable
cause to arrest for the minor offense); Marbury v. United States, 540 A.2d 114, 115-16
(D.C. 1985) (validity of stop depends solely on reasonable suspicion as to the traffic
offense); Frazier v. State, 537 So. 2d 662, 664-63 (Fla. 1989) (motive irrelevant to legality
of search); People v. Arterberry, 429 N.W.2d 574, 575 (Mich. 1988) (legality of arrest
depends solely on presence of facts establishing probable cause); Oregon v. Olaiz, 786 P.2d
734 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Cnm. App.
1986) (intentions of officer irrelevant if probable cause exists for minor offense).
2" See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 683-92; Haddad, Claims of
Sham, supra note 1, at 210-12; Salken, The General Warrant, supra note 3, at 236-42;
Amsterdam, supra note 172, at 436-37; Note, Pretext Problem, supra note 3, at 257-63;
Note, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1810-14; Note, Two Reasons to Stop, supra note
3, at 510-27.
27 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 682.
21 Massachusetts v. Pamten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
27 See Burkoff, Pretext Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 375. The availability of
evidence could dinumsh if officers believe either that testimony as to the true motive will
invalidate a search or that testimony as to dual motives will save the search.
"4 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 682-83.
"s See infra notes 281-91 and accompanying text. Proponents of the individual moti-
vation approach deem certain motives improper because they assume the motives do not
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purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the liberty and
privacy of citizens. 276 If the liberty or privacy of an individual is
restricted without sufficient cause or to an extent not justified by
the governmental interest, then that citizen should be granted relief.
But if the intrusion on the citizen's liberty or privacy is justified,
and the intrusion is limited by the government's justification, then
the citizen should not be permitted to complain that the intrusion
was motivated by the officer's unsubstantiated belief that the citi-
zen is also guilty of another offense. 27 A slight alteration of the
facts of Colorado v Bannster27 illustrates the point.
In Bannister, an officer observed a car speeding but was unable
to pursue the vehicle before it disappeared from sight. Later, he
received a report of a theft and a description of the perpetrators
of the theft. Shortly thereafter, the original vehicle reappeared,
still speeding. 279 Suppose that a second vehicle appeared at the
same time, also speeding. Suppose also that the officer had a hunch
that the first vehicle was driven by the perpetrators of the theft
that was reported. Assume the hunch was based solely on the fact
that he originally saw the vehicle in the vicinity of the theft and
did not amount to reasonable suspicion. If the officer stops the
first vehicle, the stop would be illegal under the individual moti-
vation approach, and any evidence of the theft discovered during
the stop would be excludedn °
It is easy to see why such a result has been criticized. 2 1 The
public certainly is critical when the perpetrator of the theft goes
comport with the purposes underlying the grant of authority to undertake the activity. The
difficulty of deternining the true purpose or purposes of such grants alone may preclude
such an approach. See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note I, at 685-87.
276 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police [is] at the core of the Fourth Amendment"); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983) (recognizing liberty interest protected by fourth amend-
ment).
mn The citizen should be and is entitled to complain if the stop is based on invidious
discrimination, i.e., race, but a pretext doctrine is not necessary to accomplish this result.
See infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
-- 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
2 Id. at 2.
0 The requirement under some approaches that the pretextual motive be the predom-
inant motive would not save the officer in this case because the hunch of other criminal
activity is the only thing distinguishing the two vehicles and therefore is the predominate
reason for stopping the first vehicle.
13, See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1985) (describing
such a result as "incongruous"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1962)
("It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and Ins private property are fully protected
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free because evidence is excluded, and the police officers will
probably not understand what they did wrong by exercising their
authority to stop speeding veicles.2 2 Excluding the evidence in
such a case seems more anomalous if the offense that is offered
to justify the police action is a more serious one. For instance,
should evidence of a murder discovered in the course of an arrest
for possession of marijuana be suppressed because the marijuana
arrest was motivated by the hunch that the person observed pos-
sessing marijuana was also the perpetrator of an unsolved mur-
der9283 Of course, the exclusion of evidence seems more reasonable
if the offense used to justify the police activity is a very minor one
and the intrusion fairly severe. For instance, suppression of evi-
dence of a murder would gain more support if the evidence was
obtained when a citizen was arrested in her home, booked, printed,
and interrogated about a murder, all based on an outstanding
warrant for parking violations.28 This conduct is unreasonable,
however, not because the citizen is subjected to such treatment as
a result of being a murder suspect, but because any citizen can be
subjected to such treatment when they are not suspected of murder
or any "crime" other than a mere failure to pay a parking ticket.2u5
Application of a.pretext doctrine in this case fails to cure the evil
presented.
by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.");
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 215, 253-55 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (such a rule
would "pervert the [Fourth] Amendment"); Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at
690-91; Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 211; Note, Two Reasons to Stop, supra
note 3, at 522-23.
n2 See Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 691-92; Haddad, Claims of
Sham, supra note 1, at 214. Moreover, if the rule has its intended effect and the officer
does not stop the first car and instead focuses on the second car, imagine the chagrin of
that driver if she learns she was stopped because the officer had no reason to suspect her
of additional criminal activity but did suspect the other driver of theft. If the victim learned
the officer had not stopped the suspected perpetrators, she also would be chagrined.
n3 At some point, the seriousness of the offense used to justify the police action
reaches a level where it becomes the predominant motive, thereby avoiding the label of
pretextual, at least under some tests.
2" These are the facts of State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert.
granted sub nom. Missouri v. Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 689
(1987).
2" Not all commentators agree that citizens who commit mnnor offenses, but are
otherwise free from suspicion, deserve the same protection from intrusions on their privacy
and liberty as citizens who, in addition to committing a minor offense, are also suspected
of committing another crime. See Note, Abuses of Power, supra note 1, at 1816 ("The
intrusion resulting from service of the failure to appear warrant would not be troubling if
it were served independently of a desire to investigate [a] greater crime. Use of traffic
warrants for an investigation, however, is more troubling.").
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Typical of the arguments articulated by proponents of a pretext
search doctrine is Judge Rubin's impassioned warning against the
virtually unlimited authority of officers in the field to arrest citi-
zens:
In the kind of society in which we live, few persons have a
life so blameless that some reason to arrest them cannot be found
Untold thousands of Americans are subject to arrest for
failing to pay parking tickets, failure to respond to summonses
for traffic violations, and similar minor offenses Police
who desire to arrest an individual without probable cause may
merely leaf through the files or turn to the computer to determine
whether they can find some reasons to arrest a suspect for whose
arrest they otherwise lack probable cause While I do not
condone the possible law violations that led to the imposition of
the earlier charges, I do not think such prior derelictions strip
the alleged lawbreakers of fourth amendment protection if they
should later be suspected of other offenses.26
There is great potential for abuse of citizens' constitutional protec-
tions as a result of the state's police power. Concurring in Causey,
Judge Higgonbotham analogized modern warrants to the general
writs of assistance that led to the passage of the fourth amendment:
Serious questions abound in the use of otherwise valid war-
rants to pocket a one-time pass to the strictures of the fourth
amendment rather than to prosecute for "the offense for which
probable cause was found. [T]here is a risk that with the storage
and retrieval capacity of today's computers, warrants may func-
tion in a manner similar to the old general writs of assistance.2 7
Others have made the same analogy with regard to arrests for
traffic violations and other minor offenses.288 It is misguided to
address these abuses by focusing on pretextual activity rather than
on the underlying authority to arrest for minor offenses 789 A
Causey, 834 F.2d at 1189-90 (Rubin, J., dissenting), quoted in Burkoff, Pretext
Doctrine Returns, supra note 3, at 390-91.
Causey, 834 F.2d at 1186 (Higginbottom, J., concurring).
2m See Salken,. The General Warrant, supra note 3, at 257-58, 273-74; Note, Abuses
of Power, supra note 1, at 1817.
M" Professor Haddad, by advocating making the hard choice of restricting or abolishing
police authority in all cases, not just where the motives are pretextual, attempts to focus
attention on "the most important issues: the existence and scope of fourth amendment
limitations." Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 1, at 681. Under Haddad's approach,
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pretext doctrine is a particularly poor way to check the potential
abuse of the authority to arrest for minor offenses. Among other
problems, it results in the absurdity of providing protection from
the abuse for suspected criminals, but not for otherwise law abiding
citizens.
In his dissent in Causey, Judge Rubin expressed concern over
the pretextual use of warrants for minor offenses because he did
not believe minor violations should "strip the alleged lawbreakers
of fourth amendment protection if they should later be suspected
of other offenses."1290 The flaw in Judge Rubin's analysis is that
the alleged lawbreakers were not stripped of fourth amendment
protection when they later became suspected of other offenses,
they were stripped of those protections when the warrant for the
initial minor offense was issued. At that point they became subject
to arrest. If, as Judge Rubin believes, citizens should be protected
from being subjected to search and seizure merely because they
commit a minor offense, the authority to arrest for such offenses
must be abolished. Under the rule proposed by Judge Rubin in
Causey, police retain the power to arrest citizens for minor offen-
ses. These citizens regain their fourth amendment protection only
by becoming suspects in another crime.
Rather than constructing a case-by-case pretext doctrine to
address the evils of the virtually unlimited authority of police to
arrest for minor offenses, courts should focus directly on the
reasonableness of the power to arrest in these situations. The
United States Supreme Court has suggested the merits of a lim-
tation on the authority of police to act on minor offenses on at
least two occasions. In his concurrence in United States v Gustaf-
son,291 Justice Stewart remarked, "It seems to me that a persuasive
claim might have been made in, this case that the custodial arrest
of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But no such claim
has been made." 292 Similarly, in Welsch v Wisconsin,293 the Su-
the possibility of pretext remains a factor in the decision to restrict or abolish police
authority. Id. at 651-52. See also Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 1, at 209-10
(suggesting the motivation of advocates of the use exclusion approach to pretext inay be to
achieve limits on the underlying power of police); Note, Two Reasons to Stop, supra note
3, at 518-19.
Causey, 834 F.2d at 1189 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
414 U.S. 260 (1973).
United States v. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concumng); see also
Salken, The General Warrant, supra note 3, at 253.
-3 466 U.S. 740 (1983).
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preme Court limited the authority of officers to enter a home
without a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception. The
Court refused to permit such entries to prevent destruction of
evidence of a minor offense: "[A]pplication of the exigent circum-
stances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a
minor offense . has been committed." 294
The Court's concern in Welsch was not that the entry was a
pretext, but simply that given the minor nature of the offense, a
citizen should not forfeit the fourth amendment right to be free
from warrantless searches. In her recent article, Professor Barbara
Salken suggests that this approach should be applied to the au-
thority to arrest for traffic offenses. 295 Professor Salken analogizes
the power given to officers to arrest and search for minor traffic
violations to the power officers of the Crown enjoyed under the
writs of assistance and finds the power violative of the fourth
amendment:
As with the power of the writs of assistance, the power to conduct
the search [following a minor traffic violation] (which is derivative
from the power to arrest) is the product of a grant of authority
that permits indiscriminate and arbitrary exercise. The searcher
under a writ of assistance could decide, from the entire popula-
tion, whom he wanted to search. The officer may make that same
decision from almost an identical pool-the population of li-
censed drivers. Such indiscriminate power to seize and thereby
search seems, on its face, to be prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment admonition against unjustified and arbitrary searches and
seizures. 29
Professor Salken calls this approach the "best and easiest solution
to the pretext problem." '29
The real value of Professor Salken's approach is that it attacks
the true problem-the unreasonable authority of police officers to
infringe citizens' right to liberty based on a minor offense-rather
than its effect on any perceived pretext, problem. In fact, this
approach should be expanded to reexamine police authority with
regard to all minor offenses, not just traffic offenses. Again, the
2" Id. at 753.
29S See Salken, The General Warrant, supra note 3.
2 Id. at 274.
m Id. at 252. Professor Salken believes this approach is necessary because other
suggested solutions to the pretext problem are impractical or ineffective. Id. at 274.
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goal should be to abolish the authority to arrest when the govern-
ment interests do not justify the intrusion on individual rights, not
only to prevent pretexts. That the opportunity to engage in pretex-
tual activity also will be restricted is merely coincidental, and is
unnecessary to justify the abolition of the power.
Professor Salken's approach may be no more welcome in the
courts than some of the other approaches she disnusses for that
reason.2 1 In addition to the fear of appearing to handcuff police
by "legalizing" criminal behavior, or perhaps as a result of it,
courts may view the. solution to be a legislative prerogative. 2 9 As
Judge Gee stated in Causey,
[T]he government need not authorize arrest for petty offenses
and, if they do so, should not be startled if warrants issued
pursuant to their authorizations are taken seriously and occasion-
ally executed. It is possible to enforce the law without ar-
resting petty offenders. Should the public become sufficiently
exercised about what the dissent views as abuse of such arrest
warrants, it can direct such a course of enforcement; it is not
necessary for us to read another troublesome, unstated provision
into the constitution to serve such an end. 30°
Nevertheless, recently some courts have been willing to place
limits on the underlying authority of police to engage in searches
- Id. at 274 (describing efforts to reduce ihe scope of the permissible search incident
to a minor arrest as "not welcome."). See Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1139 n.6 (4th Cir. 1982) (refusing, despite intimations by members
of Supreme Court, to place constitutional limits on officers' authority to arrest for minor
offenses); Commonwealth v. Williams, 568 A.2d 1281, 1286 (Pa. Super. 1990) (same).
I" See Note, Two Reasons to Stop, supra note '3, at 518-19. Legislatures have under-
taken this task on some occasions. See Vicknair v. State, 751 S.W.2d 180 (rex. Crim. App.
1988) (interpreting statute not to authorize arrest for infraction of criteria for inspection-
cracked taillight). Many states do not authorize stops for infractions of mandatory seat belt
laws. See, e.g., MwN. STAT. ANN. § 169.686 (West 1986 and Supp. 1990).
"I Causey, 834 F.2d at 1185 n.ii. Justice Brennan expressed similar sentiments in a
different context. Arguing in favor of requiring the appointment of counsel in cases where
imprisonment was authorized, even if not actually imposed, Justice Brennan stated,
[i]t may well be that adoption by this Court of an authorized imprisonment
standard would lead state and local governments to reexamine their criminal
statutes. A state legislature or local government might determine that it no
longer desired to authorize incarceration for certain minor offenses in light of
the expense of meeting the constitution. In my view this reexamination is long
overdue. In any event, the Court's actual imprisonment standard must inevi-
tably lead the courts to make this re-examination, which plainly should more
properly be a legislative responsibility.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 388 (1979).
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and seizures.310 Because the best solution to the problem of unbri-
dled discretion to arrest citizens for minor offenses is a reexami-
nation of that authority rather than a case-by-case pretext doctrine
aimed at legal pretexts, the current Supreme Court approach to
pretexts appears correct. A case-by-case pretext doctrine should be
reserved for fabricated pretexts; the constitutionality of legal pre-
texts should be upheld.3° The current Supreme Court approach,
however, is not completely acceptable. First, the justification for
finding legal pretexts constitutional requires that there be a reex-
amination of the underlying authority to arrest and search based
on minor offenses.3 03 If the Court is unwilling to reexamine that
authority, an argument for striking down legal pretexts on a case-
by-case basis has validity 304 Even if reexamination occurs and legal
pretexts remain constitutional, a change in the Court's approach
to fabricated pretexts still may be necessary The difficulty of
proving a fabricated pretext on a case-by-case basis may necessitate
the adoption of an objective test for such pretexts. Ironically, an
appropriate test may be the "reasonable officer" test currently
utilized by some courts to strike down legal pretexts.
"I' See, e.g., State v. Ruden, 774 P.2d 972 (Kan. 1989) (entry into home on authority
of bench warrant issued in limited action civil case violates fourth amendment and § 15 of
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights); Simpler v. State, 568 A.2d 22 (Md. 1990) (reasonable
suspicion of civil offense with maximum fine of $I00 did not justify frisk); State v. Bolte,
560 A.2d 644 (N.J. 1989) (hot pursuit of person suspected of disorderly person offenses
does not justify warrantless entry into home); People v. Lewis, 206 Cal. App. 3d 994, 254
Cal. Rptr. 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (police may not put arrestee who cannot be jailed
through booking procedure).
2 The Court should make clear it is treating fabricated and legal pretexts differently.
3 This is particularly important in the new breed of pretext cases where officers stop
individuals not based on a violation, but merely to carry out various "community caretaking
functions." See Umted States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (roadblock
established to address traffic congestion upheld); United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356
(11th Cir. 1983) (officer approached vehicle in airport parking ramp to warn driver to
expect a large parking charge); United States v. Dunbar, 470 F Supp. 704 (D. Conn. 1979)
(officer stopped vehicle to assist motorist he suspected was lost; court finds violation of
fourth amendment); State v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318 (Me. 1989) (safety concerns independ-
ent of criminal or civil violation justify stop of vehicle); State v. Hill, 557 A.2d 322 (N.J.
1989) (concern for owner-operator of unoccupied, parked vehicle did not permit search of
bag on seat of vehicle under "community caretaking function"); State v. Chisolm, 696
P.2d 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (officer stopped pickup truck to warn driver of danger of
hat blowing out of truckbed; remanded for determination of reasonableness).
- Such a doctrine still would be underinclusive in that otherwise law-abiding citizens
remain without protection. However, it may be acceptable because it is the only way to
obtain any protection and may result in a general reduction in the incidence of police
arresting or searching based-on minor offenses, because the incentive for such activity would
be reduced.
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B. The Objective Approach to Fabricated Pretexts
In most fabricated pretext cases, the officer selects a violation
that is easily concocted in order to provide the pretext for the
officer's illegal activity. This fact, combined with a natural reluc-
tance of courts to question the honesty of police officers, makes
proving a fabricated pretext difficult. 05 One way to address the
proof problem is to adopt an objective test for fabricated pretexts.
Some courts have done so.
In United States v. Smith,301 a Florida Highway Patrol officer
stopped the defendant because he believed defendant fit a drug
courier profile. 3°7 Because the court held that the facts observed by
the officer did not provide reasonable suspicion of illegal narcotics
activity, the government attempted to justify the stop based on
alleged traffic violations.308 The officer testified that the right wheels
of defendant's vehicle had crossed the white line approximately six
inches into the emergency lane and drifted over to, but did not
cross, the center line when the car returned to its lane. The gov-
ernment argued that this "weaving" either itself constituted a
traffic offense-reckless driving or failure to change lanes safely-
or provided reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. 309
The court rejected the argument that the observed traffic vio-
lation justified the stop because "[t]he district court expressly
found that no traffic violation had occurred. ' 310 Thus, at least one
of the justifications offered by the government was fabricated. The
court also addressed the government's legal pretext argument. The
court held that the fact that the officer could have stopped the
vehicle based on the reasonable suspicion of driving under the
influence was irrelevant. The court stated that "in determining
whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper
inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure
30 See Dunbar, 470 F Supp. at 708 (limiting authority of officer to stop "lost"
motorist in part due to danger of officers fabricating suspicions about individuals being
lost).
3 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986).
- The trooper relied upon the facts that the car was travelling 50 m.p.h. (the speed
limit was 55), the car was occupied by two individuals who were approximately thirty years
of age, the car displayed out-of-state tags, the driver appeared to be driving overly cautiously
and did not look in the officer's direction as he passed the officer, and it was 3:00 a.m.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 708.
"' Id. at 708-09.
30 Id. at 709.
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in the absence of illegitimate motivation. 3" ' ,Because a reasonable
officer would not have stopped the defendant based on the minor
"weaving" within the lane, the court rejected the legal pretext
offered by the government.31 2
Six months later, in United States v Miller,1 3 the Eleventh
Circuit faced another drug courier profile stop by the same officer
effected on less than reasonable suspicion. The government again
attempted to justify the stop based on the vehicle's right wheels
crossing the white lane marker, this time by four inches for ap-
proximately 6.5 seconds.3 14 Rather than decide whether the pretext
was fabricated, the court applied the test for legal pretexts set out
in Smith: "whether a reasonable officer would have made the
seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation. ' 315 The court
struck down the stop as pretextual because the answer to this
question was negative. The result was accomplished without having
to determne whether a traffic offense had in fact occurred.
The Miller and Smith decisions viewed the reasonable officer
test as an effective means to regulate pretexts. The Smith court
utilized the test to strike down a legal pretext, but the Miller court
utilized the test without deternmmng whether the pretext before it
was fabricated or legal. The Smith court explained that the test
was required to maintain "the necessary connection between a
seizure's justification and its scope" and thus prevent officers from
making "the random, arbitrary stops denounced in Terry ,316
Without this limitation, police officers "[w]ith little more than an
inarticulate 'hunch' of illegal activity could begin following a
vehicle and then stop it for the slightest deviation from a completely
steady course. 317 The Court quoted a thirty-year-old Florida Su-
preme Court case, Collins v State,318 to explain the danger of a
rule that permits this scenario:
A holding that such a feeble reason would justify a halting
and searclng would mean that all travelers on the highway could
hazard such treatment, for who among them would not be guilty
of crossing the center line so much as a foot from time to time.
3" Id. at 708.
312 Id.
33 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987).
3,4 Id. at 547.
I' Id. at 549.
316 Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
317 Id.
31, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953).
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All could, therefore, be subjected to inconvemence, ignominy,
and embarrassment 319
The rule constructed by the Smith court does not adequately
address the potential abuse with which both the Smith and Collins
courts were concerned. The rule is underinclusive because officers
still can use traffic offenses to stop citizens for whom they harbor
inarticulate hunches of criminal activity. The officer need only
utilize a traffic offense for which a court will find a reasonable
officer would have stopped the vehicle even without illegitimate
motives. Given the numbers of offenses that are likely to fall in
this category, it is unlikely that the rule significantly reduces the
class of citizens subject to being stopped. Moreover, citizens are
still subject to being seized, arrested, and searched if an officer
chooses to strictly enforce minor traffic laws. If the officer does
not suspect a narcotics offense and, in fact, does not discover
narcotics, the test for pretextual activity would be inapplicable; the
activity would be upheld. But the fact that a reasonable officer
would not make the seizure in question suggests that citizens should
not be subject to such intrusions, regardless of the motive.
The reasonable officer test is also overinclusive because an
officer who, without suspicion of other illegal activity, aggressively
pursues traffic offenders will be unable to use evidence discovered
in plain view during the traffic stop if the offense is one for which
a reasonable officer would not have stopped the vehicle. Thus,
while attempting to prevent pretexts, the test also results in non-
pretextual activity being declared illegal.
The reasonable officer test inadequately addresses the problem
of the officer's virtually unlimited authority to arrest for minor
offenses, and it is an inappropriate mechanism for assessing legal
pretexts. Nevertheless, it is a suitable test to regulate fabricated
pretexts. It is often difficult to prove a fabricated pretext because
the officer chooses a minor offense about which it is easy to lie.3 20
Since everyone commits minor offenses, the court has little reason
to doubt, or is hard pressed to explain why it doesn't believe, that
the defendant committed the offense. As illustrated by the Miller
case, the reasonable officer test permits the court to provide relief
even absent an express finding that the offense did not occur. The
ovennclusiveness of the test is justified by the difficulty of proving
"I Smith, 799 F.2d at 711 (quoting Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. 1953)).
'2 See supra note 87.
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
a fabricated pretext and, given the minor nature .of the offense,
the relative unimportance of enforcing the law that allegedly was
violated.3 71 Of course, officers can react to that rule by fabricating
more serious offenses-those for which a reasonable officer would
have made the stop or arrest. Arguably, officers will be deterred
from fabricating more serious offenses either because it is more
difficult to do so or because they are simply more reluctant to
falsely accuse individuals of more serious offenses. In addition, a
defendant will be entitled to relief, regardless of the nature of the
offense, if she can prove that the pretext is actually fabricated.
Because the reasonable officer test is overinclusive, it also
eliminates some legal pretexts, which is apparently why some courts
have adopted it. Other courts may have mixed motives, adopting
the test because they believe it necessary to regulate both legal and
fabricated pretexts. Even the courts that have adopted the test for
the singular purpose of addressing legal pretexts are unlikely to be
concerned if it also eliminates fabricated pretexts. Similarly, al-
though it is argued here that the test should be adopted solely-
because it is necessary to police fabricated pretexts, the overinclu-
sive effect on legal pretexts is acceptable given the small govern-
ment interest in enforcing the minor offense offered as a legal
pretext. Thus, ironically, if the motivation of the courts adopting
the test is ignored, advocates on both sides of the pretext doctrine
debate can claim victory in the adoption of the reasonable officer
test.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has never struck down police
activity as unconstitutional based on the subjective intentions of
the officer in the particular case and is unlikely to do so in the
near future. The confusion surrounding the Supreme Court's re-
sponse to the pretext issue results from a failure by commentators
to understand that the Court's definition of pretext includes both
legal and fabricated pretexts. Once the Court's definition is under-
stood, careful analysis of Supreme Court cases reveals a consistent
approach to the pretext issue.
Under the Supreme Court's current pretext doctrine, only fab-
ricated pretexts are declared unlawful on a case-by-case basis. Legal
pretexts are upheld as constitutional. Although the possibility of
2I See Note, Pretext Problem, supra note 3, at 268-69.
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legal pretextual activity may lead the Court to make the "hard
choice" to restrict or eliminate the underlying authority of the
police in all cases, on a case-by-case basis the only relevant inquiry
is whether the facts within the officer's knowledge provided the
level of suspicion required to justify the intrusion suffered by the
defendant. The subjective intent of the officer, whether assessed
by objective or subjective evidence, is irrelevant.3 2
The efforts of courts and commentators focusing on legal
pretexts to address the problem of the virtually unlimited authority
of officers to arrest and search citizens based on minor offenses
are misguided. The focus should be on the underlying authority to
arrest and search rather than the pretextual use of such authority
Persuasive arguments can be made that the Constitution should
protect citizens from arrest and search based on a minor offense. 32
A focus on legal pretexts provides such protection only for mdi-
viduals suspected of more serious offenses and leaves otherwise
law-abiding citizens subject to the unfettered discretion of the
police. The absurdity of such a result is a major flaw in the
individual motivation approach to legal pretexts.
Conversely, there is virtual unanimous agreement that fabri-
cated pretexts should be declared unlawful on a case-by-case basis.
Moreover, the difficulty of proving fabricated pretexts justifies the
adoption of an objective test to decide such cases. The reasonable
officer test is an appropriate test for this purpose and, because it
also has been adopted as a test for legal pretexts, it may prove a
suitable comprormse m the pretext doctrine debate. Regardless of
the ultimate outcome of the pretext doctrine, courts must address
the true evil lurking in the pretext cases-the virtually unlimited
authority of police officers to arrest and search citizens based on
minor offenses. This authority must be restricted or, in some cases,
abolished by the courts or the legislatures. Unless that power is
restricted or abolished, the analogy to the general warrants and
In As expressed by the Seventh Circuit m dealing with an allegedly pretextual arrest
for dnving with a suspended license,
[Tihe reasonableness of an arrest depends upon the existence of two objective
factors. First, did the arresting officer have probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Second, was the
arresting officer authorized by a state and or municipal law to effect a custodial
arrest for the particular offense. If these two factors are present, that
arrest is necessarily reasonable under the fourth amendment.
United States v. Tngg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989).
In See Salken, The General Warrant, supra note 3.
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writs of assistance will remain accurate, and United States citizens
will be forced to tolerate the very evil against which the fourth
amendment was designed to protect.24
32 See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988).
[VOL. 79
